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Resumen
En 1981 comenzó en Chile una crisis económica y financiera considerada entre las más grandes de
este siglo. Sin embargo, su solución resultó ser bastante heterodoxa ya que las medidas tomadas
parecieron muchas veces arbitrarias y en más de alguna oportunidad hubo importantes reveses de
las mismas. A pesar de lo anterior la economía se recuperó relativamente rápido y desde entonces el
sistema financiero chileno se ha fortalecido de manera importante, al punto que la reciente crisis
financiera internacional no causó ningún problema a los bancos chilenos. En este trabajo se analiza
y evalúa la experiencia chilena de comienzos de los años ochenta, en particular, el contexto interno
y externo en que se dio la crisis financiera de 1982-86, y las políticas que se implementaron para su
cabal solución. El trabajo intenta identificar cuáles políticas funcionaron y cuáles no. Además, en la
medida que la disponibilidad de datos así lo permite, el trabajo evalúa cómo y cuáles de las distintas
políticas permitió la recuperación de la solvencia del sistema financiero.
Abstract
Starting in 1981, Chile went into a deep economic and financial crisis. The Chilean solution to the
crisis was heterodox in the sense that many policies appear to have been arbitrary, and policy
mistakes were made and corrected along the way. However, the economy recovered relatively
quickly, and since has built a strong financial sector that allowed the country to avoid the financial
turmoil observed during 1995 and 1997-98 in other emerging market economies. This paper
reviews and evaluates the Chilean experience of the early 1980s. In particular, it discusses the
macroeconomic internal and external environment that led to the banking crisis, and describes in
detail the main measures implemented to its resolution. The paper attempts to identify which
policies worked and which ones did not. To the extent allowed by the data, we try to see how (and
which of) the different policies led to a recovery of the solvency in the banking system.
_________________________
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1.  INTRODUCTION
This paper is about the origins and resolution of the Chile’s banking crisis
precipitated by the 1982-83 recession.  In the past 150 years, several times Chile suffered
large income losses because of a decline in its terms of trade or other external shocks, and
often it had to reverse expansionary domestic policies.  The 1982-83 recession was the
fourth largest one after the Great Depression, the oil crisis of the mid-1970s, and the one
at the beginning of the First World War.  Aggregate output fell in real terms over 20
percent between the peak level of the third quarter of 1981 and the bottom level of the
same quarter of 1983.  By late 1983, unemployment had climbed to over 30 percent of
the labor force, and the share of population in absolute poverty had increased to around
55 percent from about 30 percent in 1981 (Hernández and Mayer, 1998).  Also, CPI-
measured inflation had more than double in relation to the low level of 9.5 percent in the
twelve months to December 1981.
The magnitude of the 1982-83 recession was determined by the circumstances of
the economy at that time.  First, in the two years up to mid-1981, the domestic private
demand for consumption and fixed capital investment had increased rapidly to a record
level. Later most of this investment would be the basis for a large increase in output and
exports, but in late 1981 it had yet to mature.  Independent of its driving forces, the
expansion of domestic private demand was possible by the sudden access to both
domestic and foreign loanable funds intermediated mostly by private national banks
(foreign banks still accounted for a small share of domestic loan markets).
Second, to some extent, the bank’s loan portfolios reflected excessive risk taking
by banks in the sense that their depositors (and perhaps other creditors) had not been
explicitly fully compensated by the credit risks they were taking.  The magnitude of this
problem was not known at the time of the crisis, and has never been possible to assess its
importance.  Although two large banks were intervened in November 1981 because of the
allegation of excessive risk taking, when the crisis deepened in 1982 the deterioration of
the loan portfolios was due mostly to the new macroeconomic conditions.
Third, the 1980-81 boom had led to changes in relative prices, in particular, an
increase in real wages. The latter resulted from the economic boom, the indexation of
nominal wages to past inflation and from substantial reductions in the cost of labor to
companies (due to cuts in wage taxes). These changes were difficult to reverse in the
recession mainly because of Chile’s traditional inflationary bias—changes in relative
prices were possible only by increasing some nominal prices. The reforms of labor laws
notwithstanding, nominal wages were still rigid downwards and political pressures
quickly mounted for devaluing the Chilean peso.
Fourth, last but not least, notwithstanding the new legal and government
institutions of the 1980 Constitution, they were yet to bound effectively government’s
powers.  Thus, given the income losses anticipated by the main constituencies of the2
military government, pressures for its intervention quickly mounted.  It took some time
for the government to abandon its commitments to a fixed exchange rate policy and to a
policy of no bailing out any party affected by the crisis.
By mid-1981, the record level of the aggregate demand for consumption and
investment was no longer sustainable. The increase in real interest rates in the first
semester of 1981 and the decline in terms of trade in the previous twelve months forced a
contraction in private demand for both consumption and investment.  The magnitude of
the subsequent recession was determined by some combination of all four factors
mentioned above.  Independent of their relative importance in determining the magnitude
of the recession, it is important to note that these factors were not the cause of the large
expansion in private demand in previous years. The latter was a direct consequence of
new and raising expectations about the country’s potential income level, in turn the result
mainly of the economic reforms of 1974-81 and the new institutions of the 1980
Constitution. (Table 1.1 shows in a chronological order and in a nutshell the events that
led to the crisis and the recovery of the Chilean economy.)
The resolution of the financial crisis triggered a complex process.  It took some
time to complete it, and it consisted mainly of many ad-hoc measures.  To achieve their
objectives, most had to be revised and fine tuned often.  Table 1.2 summarizes the
measures as if they had been part of a comprehensive plan, but it took some time for all
pieces to fall into a coherent approach.  More important, it was an expensive process with
a cumulative fiscal cost of over 40 percent of GDP.  Nevertheless, its success was a
prerequisite for aggregate demand and output to recover their pre-crisis levels.
The recovery that started by 1985 led to high GDP growth rates (per capita GDP
reached the 1981 record level in 1988) and facilitated the development of a strong
financial sector that since then has fared well the turmoil of international capital markets.
In fact, Chile’s recovery probed to be more sustainable than that of other Latin American
economies affected at that time by a serious external debt crisis.
Four elements were decisive to that strong and sustainable recovery.  First, key
macroeconomic variables—i.e., fiscal deficit, inflation, etc.—were kept under control or
stabilized around reasonably low levels in the years following the crisis (and additional
progress was made on reducing or stabilizing them through the 1990s). Second, Chile’s
terms of trade recovered after 1987, greatly facilitating the restoration of fiscal discipline
and external equilibrium.  Third, the incentives to substitute equity capital for debt
capital—in particular, the reform of the income tax system to encourage the reinvestment
of profits—were effective.  Finally, the prudential and regulatory frameworks for banks
and other financial companies were completely overhauled in the aftermath of the 1982-
84 crisis.
This paper briefly studies the origins of the Chilean banking crisis of 1982-86,
and, in greater detail, the different measures and programs developed by the government
to resolve it. To the extent allowed by the data the paper also attempts to discuss the
rationale and cost-effectiveness of all these measures. Section two sets the stage by3
discussing the main reforms of the financial system and the main macroeconomic
developments in the seven years previous to the crisis. Section three discusses in greater
detail each of the most important crisis resolution measures, focusing on their rationale
and effects. Each of the sub-sections here analyzes one particular measure implemented
to deal with the crisis. Finally, section four presents some final remarks –albeit tentative–
regarding the cost effectiveness of the different measures. The conclusions drawn from
this paper can be useful when designing policies to deal with (or prevent) other banking
crises such as the recent ones in East Asia.
Table 1.1
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2.  BANKS AND THE MACROECONOMY
A. Reforming Chile: The new banking system, 1974-81
By September 1973, the Chilean banking system was under government control.
Since the Great Depression, government intervention in a variety of forms had been
expanding, but in late 1970, ownership of most banks was still private. During the Allende
government, from December 1970 to September 1973, however, CORFO (Corporacion de
Fomento, a state-owned financial institution) bought a controlling stake in most private
banks (it failed only to buy enough shares to control Banco de Chile—the largest private
bank—and three small banks).  Also, the Central Bank played a much larger role in the
mobilization and allocation of bank deposits.
Privatization
As part of its market-oriented reform of most economic institutions, the military
government set the foundations of a private banking system by reprivatizing most banks
and by changing the regulation of private banking.  The reprivatization started in mid 1975,
and to facilitate it, CORFO auctioned shares to the highest bidder who could borrow from
CORFO up to 90 percent of the price.  The process took longer than anticipated at its
beginning because the new owners of a few banks failed to service their debts with
CORFO, and the banks had to go again through the auction process.
1  The reprivatization of
banks took place simultaneously with that of nonfinancial enterprises, and their timing was
criticized because of the low prices at which the banks and the enterprises apparently were
sold.  They were also criticized because of the appearance of a bias towards ownership by
the few Chileans with access to foreign capital and, therefore, the high concentration of
ownership in a few conglomerates or grupos económicos.
2
Bank reprivatization was followed by a gradual relaxation of entry restrictions.
Although few new Chilean banks were authorized, the controlling shareholders of some old
banks changed, and in early 1978, foreign banks started to open subsidiaries.  Thus, the
number of national banks increased from 21 at the beginning of the reprivatization process
to 25 at the end of 1981 (including Banco del Estado, the state bank established in the early
1950s that the military government decided not to privatize).  Also, by the end of 1981,
there were 19 subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in Chile, but they still accounted for
less than 5 and 10 percent of the total assets and loans of all financial institutions,
respectively (Table 2.1).
                                                
1  Banco Osorno was one of these banks; after its privatization in late 1975, it was intervened in late 1976,
and later CORFO recovered 64 percent of the bank’s shares, which were sold again to private investors in
mid 1979.
2  These conglomerates consisted of a controlling shareholder of several investment companies or sociedades
de papel which, in turn, were the shareholders of banks and nonbank financial institutions, as well as of
companies involved in the production of goods and services or empresas con chimenea.6
Table 2.1 Number of Financial Institutions
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Number of financial institutions 42 49 49 55 61 50 45 45
Public banks 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Share in total assets (%) 27.4 22.9 21.2 18.9 16.2 18.1 18.5
Private banks 20 21 21 23 24 20 18 18
Share in total assets (%) (1) 66.7 71.4 72.5 77.7 82.0 67.8 68.3
Finance Companies 18 21 18 18 17 10 7 7
Share in total assets (%) 5.9 5.7 6.3 3.4 1.8 1.3 1.1
Foreign banks 3 6 9 13 19 19 19 19
Share in total assets (%) 12.8 12.2
Share in total loans (%) 2.4 4.2 4.9 8.7 12.6 9.2
Share in total deposits (%) 0.5 2.2 2.7 7.0 14.8 13.8
Notes: (1) includes foreign banks for 1978-82. Sources: Larraín (1989) and Valdés-Prieto (1994).
The new rules
The restoration of private banking was accompanied by new rules to govern bank
activities. Their effectiveness was conditioned, however, on the recognition of credible
bounds on government powers.  Since the military government was the consequence of a
breakdown in the country’s institutions of law and government, credible bounds on its
powers took time to build. The credibility of banking and other reforms could not be
established until after the government had actually proved that it abode to its commitment
to maintain the new rules even under the pressure of new circumstances.  In particular, it
was difficult to establish that credibility after the collapse of the savings and loan
associations in June 1975, when the government unexpectedly and arbitrarily prohibited the
repayment of their obligations and forced their rescheduling.
3 Initially, at least in 1974-76,
there was a fear that the banking system could continue to be instrumental to the financing
of public deficits. To compete with other intermediaries, private banks had to be relieved of
this burden. The successful fiscal reform of 1975 was critical for this relief, but not
sufficient because of the need to rebuild the central bank’s international reserves. High
reserve requirements on bank deposits, with a compensation related to the interest rate paid
on time deposits, were then used to finance the accumulation of international reserves.
Between December 1976 and December 1980, the gradual reduction of reserve
requirements became a source of loanable funds, but more important these policies
strengthened the credibility of the government’s commitment not to tax financial
intermediation (Table 2.2).
                                                
3 The fact that the government decision was perceived as arbitrary and unexpected by the general public
reflects the lack of a clear set of rules at the time.7
    Table 2.2: Programmed Reductions in Reserve Requirements (in percent)
Demand deposits 30 to 89 day
time deposits
90 day to 1 yr.
time deposits
First stage: May 1976-December 1977
Initial rates 85 55 55
Final rates 59 20 8
Second stage: January 1978-July 1978
Initial rates 59 20 8
Final rates 42 20 8
Third stage: August 1978-March 1979
Initial rates No changes
Final rates
Fourth stage: April 1979-December 1979
Initial rates 42 19 8
Final rates 42 8 8
Fifth stage: January 1980-December 1980
Initial rates 21 7 7
Final rates 10 4 4
Source: Valdés-Prieto (1994)
The new rules of private banking were to reflect the needs of competition. The rules
that evolved between 1930 and 1970 limited competition between banks and nonbank
intermediaries (by imposing constraints on bank activities in exchange for the privilege of
raising funds with a sort of government guarantee) as well as within the banking industry
(by forcing reliance on non-price instruments that required government’s authorization,
such as the opening of branches).  Indeed, the old rules were the foundation of a repressed
financial system, and they could not be the basis of a new system in which banks were to
compete openly for deposits and loans.  The concern about excessive risk taking by banks
was to be balanced with the market discipline brought about by the need of competition, but
in accordance with some prevailing ideas, the initial debate centered largely on how to
eliminate gradually the specialization of bank activities.  The elimination of rules imposing
artificial differences between banks was finished only in December 1981.
Capital requirements
The role of capital requirements did not change in this period.  They were set in terms
of the minimum amounts needed to enter the industry, and were gradually unified across
types of banks to eliminate their specialization.  Also, capital adequacy was regarded as an
upper limit to the size of banks rather than as self-insurance for the portfolio risk. Thus,
capitalization was set at a minimum of 5 percent of domestic liabilities, and after April
1980, of total (domestic and foreign) liabilities.
In January 1978, the Superintendency of Banks was authorized to classify loans and
other investments according to their risk and to assess their values relative to liabilities.  It
took however until February 1980, for the Superintendency to issue the first set of rules on
how banks should assess and report the risks of their loans and investments (the banks were
to report only to the Superintendency).  Apparently the initial reports on the risks of loans
and other investments made clear that the new system would require banks to increase
substantially their capital if they were going to have enough self-insurance for these risks.8
In addition, the rules on provisions against losses continued to be based on the idea of a
general provision of 2 percent of the loan portfolio plus special provisions for loans in
arrears. The rules were to be changed after the risk classification of loans and other
investments became fully effective.
The regulation of lending practices and credit risk
The rules setting prudential constraints on lending and investment portfolios and the
rules forcing timely disclosure of accurate information evolved slowly.  In 1975, when the
country was facing a depression and the government was strongly inclined to rely on the
private sector for rebuilding the economy, there were fears of imposing a heavy regulatory
burden on private banks.  Because of these fears, rules on collateral and secured loans were
simple and many loans were not properly secured; rules on nonperforming loans and
provisions for loan losses were below international standards; and rules on the assessment
and classification of loan risks were implemented gradually. Besides, the government
recognized its limited capability to enforce rules, in particular to enforce them evenly and
fairly.  Except for the rules governing entry, several of the rules on lending practices, in
particular the rules about connected lending, were enforced poorly and banks were able to
take advantage of many loopholes in the regulatory system.
In December 1976, the failure of Banco Osorno and several financial companies
made clear the dilemma the government faced about the regulation of private banking. It
had to choose between tight regulation of banks with preemptive intervention, and lax
control offset by a presumption of fraud in case of failure.  The government opted for the
latter. Thus, the controlling shareholders of Banco Osorno lost their equity and control of
the bank, and more important, they faced fraud trials that took years to settle. The
government applied the same principles to the financial companies that were liquidated at
that time. The government clearly signaled that it was willing to held owners and managers
of failed banks personally liable for the losses and to prosecute them for fraud.
4 Likely the
full repayment of the liabilities of Banco Osorno and other failing institutions contributed
to the expectation that the state guarantee amounted to 100 percent of the system’s
liabilities (a limited deposit insurance scheme was set in early 1977). But the severe
penalties for mismanagement should have restrained the risks effectively taken by bank
managers. The penalties were severe because there was no clear distinction between
mismanagement and fraud and any failure was presumed by the government to be the result
of fraud (a presumption later on applied to all failed banks).  In other words, the allegation
of fraud should have deterred bank managers and the controlling shareholders (which
usually were managers or board members) to take excessive risks.
                                                
4 This message was clearly stated in the case of La Familia, a finance company whose owners and managers
were close to the government but who nevertheless were prosecuted.9
The regulation of liabilities
On the liability side, the most important reform referred to foreign borrowing.
Starting in April 1979, the rules governing foreign borrowing by banks were relaxed, and
after April 1980, their foreign and domestic liabilities were subject to the same rules.  Thus,
after April 1980, the only constraint to foreign borrowing by banks was the capital
adequacy ratio of a minimum of 5 percent of their total liabilities.
The new rules were relevant for banks to access the international credit markets.  For
all Chilean borrowers, this access was regulated by Article 14 of the Foreign Exchange
Transactions Law. Article 14 limited foreign borrowing by setting conditions to guarantee
the access to the official foreign exchange market to repay foreign creditors.  These
conditions were changed a few times in the late 1970s and were effective in limiting short-
term borrowing.  Thus, after April 1980, to access international credit markets, banks had to
comply with the capital adequacy ratio (at that time it was not binding for all banks) and the
conditions of Article 14.  Given the international market conditions at that time, the reform
implied a large potential for borrowing abroad, and it turned to have important effects on
bank performance in 1980-81. Indeed, foreign loans became the main source of banks
funding during 1981-82 (Table 2.3, column 4).
Table 2.3
Funding of  the Change in the Financial System’s Assets
(in  percent; from real values)
Year [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
1977 50.4 29.2 8.4 3.3 0.5 9.1
1978 41.3 28.7 3.5 10.8 3.6 -5.3
1979 29.6 17.5 1.8 7.5 2.2 0.5
1980 40.3 23.7 3.6 11.3 1.7 -0.1
1981 11.3 1.6 -2.3 11.4 0.2 0.5
1982 22.6 -0.1 2.3 20.5 0.4 -0.6
Notes: [1] Change in total assets (in percent). [2]-[6] Sources of funds as follows
Change in liabilities: [2] Deposits [3] Domestic loans [4] Foreign loans
Change in other sources: [5] Capital [6] Provisions
B. From depression to euphoria (1974-81)
External shocks and the crisis of 1975
In late 1974, at the beginning of banking reform, Chile suffered large income losses
because of a sharp decline in its terms of trade.  Moreover, the public sector was running a
large deficit, and projections for 1975 estimated a public sector deficit much larger than the
current account deficit in the balance of payments (over 20 and 10 percent of GDP,
respectively).  To make matters worse, due to political reasons Chile could not rely on
having access to significant foreign funds to finance the two deficits.  Thus, to eliminate the
two deficits, the military government had no choice but to cut public expenditures10
drastically, to increase public revenues through a tax reform and other measures, to decree a
large devaluation of the domestic currency, and to pursue a tight monetary policy.
The government plan succeeded, and both deficits were eliminated rapidly.  In early
1976 the current account of the balance of payments changed to a surplus, and that year the
non-financial public sector run a small surplus.  The plan could not prevent, however, high
unemployment rates and sharp declines in per capita output and income, which in 1975
were around 80 and 75 percent of their levels during the late 1960s. Also, the plan implied a
large depreciation of the real exchange rate, and consequently a large decline in real wages
(to over 60 percent of their level in the late 1960s).
The banking system played at best a minor role in the elimination of the two deficits.
Deposits were too low at the beginning of the crisis and most were channeled to the central
bank through high reserve requirements on deposits.  Almost all deposits were short term,
less than 30 days, and once the controls on interest rates were lifted, their nominal values
increased sharply. By early 1976, interest rates were free but deposits continued at low
levels (the composition changed, however, implying a higher average cost; see last two
columns in Table 2.4). Until mid 1976, banks could hardly mobilize deposits.  In addition
to the sharp decline in disposable income that led to negative national savings, the inflation
rate continued to be high and erratic.  Also, there was uncertainty about the government’s
commitment to the new rules because of a few reversals in interest rate policy and the
intervention in the collapse of S&L associations.  And there was some competition from the
formal and informal financial companies that started business in late 1974.   On the other
hand, the private demand for bank loans increased sharply.  The main sources of this
demand were the huge cash deficits of the many companies affected by the depression and
the reprivatization of nonfinancial enterprises.
Table 2.4
INFLATION RATES AND REAL COST OF BANK LIABILITIES
(in percent per year)





1975 340.7 410.9 14.0 13.9
1976 174.3 151.5 16.6 18.5
1977 63.5 65.0 13.9 16.1
In sum, during the depression, banks continued to intermediate funds to finance the
government.  Increasingly, however, they were able to allocate the flow supply of funds to
private borrowers, albeit at high real interest rates.  According to the series of nominal
interest rates on short-term loans, in late 1975 and early 1976, ex post real rates exceeded
50 percent per year.  There are two caveats to these estimates, however.  First, apparently
the rates paid by connected borrowers were much lower.   Second, as estimates of the ex
ante rates relevant to a large number and variety of borrowers, ex post rates could lead to11
wrong inferences as they did not take account of the large changes in relative prices and
related expectations of additional changes or even reversals.
The recovery of 1976-79
By mid 1976, the two deficits had been eliminated, but macroeconomic stability was
still elusive. Inflation continued to be high and erratic, and international reserves net of
Central Bank’s foreign liabilities were negative at a time when the government could not
have access to foreign credit. Thus, between mid 1976 and the pegging of the nominal
exchange rate in June 30 1979, the reduction of inflation and the accumulation of
international reserves were the driving forces of monetary, exchange rate and financial
policies. Given the new conditions of the macroeconomy in mid 1976, the government
assumed that the recovery of output and income would be led by a large reallocation of
resources to the production of tradable goods and services.  Thus, it could aim its policies at
reducing inflation to its historical level (around 20 percent per year) or even to the level of
developed countries, but this reduction would have to be gradual because the inflation tax
was needed to finance the accumulation of international reserves.  Moreover, since the
current account surplus could be expected to turn into a deficit once the recovery of output
was advanced, restrictions on inflows of foreign capital had to be removed to ensure an
excess supply of foreign exchange at the official exchange rate.  After a period of
uncertainty about exchange rate policy (two nominal revaluations of the Chilean peso were
followed by a nominal devaluation), starting in December 1977, the nominal exchange rate
was determined largely by the need to ensure a sustained reduction in inflation (Table 2.5).












1976 199.3 -- 63.59 107.9 0.7
1977 84.1 57.9 57.07 273.3 1.4
1978 37.2 20.1 68.14 1058 4.2
1979 38.9 14.0 70.20 2313.8 6.6
1980 31.2 0.0 60.81 4073.7 9.5
1981 9.5 0.0 52.88 3775.3 7.1
1982 20.7 89.8 58.96 2577.5 8.8
1983 23.1 18.6 70.82 2022.7 8.8
1984 23.0 46.9 74.00 2055.9 7.7
1985 26.4 43.3 90.86 1866.7 8.2
(1) An increase is a depreciation. Source: Central Bank of Chile.12
It took longer than anticipated to achieve the two objectives of low inflation and high
reserves.
5  By mid 1979, it was widely believed that fixing the peso to the US dollar would
accelerate the convergence of domestic inflation to the international level, and that soon the
accumulated reserves would be enough to deal with external shocks.  By then, output and
income per capita had certainly recovered their levels of the late 1960s, and measures of the
real exchange rate showed some appreciation in relation to 1975 levels, albeit still a large
depreciation in relation to the late 1960s.  More important, the new conditions appeared
appropriate to expand market-oriented reforms to labor contracts and to services under
government control, such as social security, education and health. Modernization became
the catchword of government action in these areas.  Also, it was the rationale for pushing a
constitutional reform, which would provide a stronger institutional foundation to the market
economy.
In the recovery period (i.e., from mid 1976 to mid 1979) banks played an important
role as intermediaries of domestic funds to private business.  Because of the reduction in
reserve requirements (Table 2.2), their flow supply of loanable funds to private business
exceeded the flow supply of deposits.  Given the initial low levels of bank credit to the
private sector, it was not surprising that the stock of this credit increased at high rates (also,
banks benefited from the collapse of financial companies in 1977).  By mid 1979, this stock
was close to 20 percent of GDP, slightly higher than the stock of bank liabilities with the
private sector (only around the end of 1978, banks became net suppliers of funds to the
private sector).  Although banks had already started to access international credit markets,
in mid 1979, their intermediation of foreign funds still consisted largely of trade credit.
Since the private demand for bank credit also increased at high rates during the recovery
period—mainly due to a growing competition for taking over existing assets and
enterprises—the decline of interest rates was slow (Table 2.6).
Table 2.6 Financial System Development
ANNUAL REAL GROWTH (%) RATIOS:
Year [1] [2] [3] [4] [6] [7]
1978 53.6 58.4 41.3 51.0 0.232 0.340
1979 31.9 30.7 29.6 29.9 0.282 0.393
1980 45.9 41.2 40.3 42.8 0.376 0.510
1981 17.8 11.2 11.3 11.6 0.498 0.643
1982 20.7 17.0 22.6 24.7 0.733 0.928
1983 -8.5 11.6 12.3 11.8 0.734 1.037
Notes: Annual Real Growth (%) of [1] total loans, [2] asset portfolio, [3] total assets, [4] medium-and
short-term plus demand deposits. Ratios of [6] total Loans/GDP, [7] total assets/GDP
In mid 1979, real interest rates on loans were still close to 20 percent per year (with
the same caveats mentioned above for the depression period).  Real interest rates on
deposits had already declined to less than 5 percent per year, however.  Despite the low
                                                
5  The delay was due to a variety of reasons, including the border conflict with Argentina, some conflict
between the two objectives of lower inflation and reserve accumulation, and problems in changing and fine
tuning policies.  However, these negative forces were partly offset by improvements in Chile’s terms of
trade.13
levels of reserve requirements in mid 1979, for all banks, the average interest income
spread over total assets continued to be high at around 7 percent (Table 2.7). Operational
costs other than loss provisions were high during all the recovery period; apparently the
high costs were due to the expansion of banks into new geographical areas and new lines of
business, as well as the upgrading of skills and technology.  In comparison with expected
rates of return on capital in nonfinancial activities (about 30 percent before taxes), the ex-
post rates of return on bank capital certainly were not high (around 20 percent before taxes).
Table 2.7
INTERMEDIATION MARGINS AND PROFITS OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
(In percent except column 7)
FM/A GOM/A PE/A AE/A OE/A P/A A/E P/E
Year [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]* [7] [8]
1978 6.7 10.5 1.6 5.7 0.7 2.5 7.5 18.5
1979 7.0 10.1 1.8 5.1 0.6 2.6 8.8 23.0
1980 6.9 8.9 1.7 4.9 0.1 2.2 10.5 23.5
1981 6.0 7.4 1.9 4.3 0.2 1.0 11.8 11.4
1982 4.5 6.3 3.4 3.6 -1.0 0.3 12.4 4.1
Notes: FM: Financial Margin = (Interest income-interest expenses) GOM: Gross Operating Margin = (operating income-
operating expenses) PE: Portfolio expenses = (Provisions + Write-offs) AE: Administration Expenditures OE: Other
expenses net of other non-operating income P: Profit before taxes A: Total Assets E: Equity. * [6]=[2]-[3]-[4]-[5]
The euphoria of 1980-81
In late 1979, the process of modernization was underway and the main trends of the
recovery period became pronounced.  In the following two years, the private demand for
consumption and investment increased at high rates, driving output and income per capita at
levels higher than the ones of the late 1960s.
 6  While the recovery of 1976-79 was based on
the opportunities to reallocate resources created by the depression and the market-oriented
reforms, the expansion of 1980-81 was based on optimistic expectations about the country’s
economic potential.  Independent of their origin, these expectations led to large increases in
asset prices and consequently to wealth effects on consumption and to investment
opportunities.  Even the incipient deterioration of the world economy failed to prevent the
emergence and consolidation of such expectations.  They peaked after the referendum on
the new Constitution in September 1980—when both the economy and the government
were surfing on their own euphoria—and remained strong until early 1981.  By then, the
world economy was already in a recession and Chile had started to suffer again from a large
decline in its terms of trade.  Moreover, the private sector had already borrowed abroad
large amounts at floating interest rates, and the burden of servicing this debt started to
increase pari-passu with LIBO rates.  In the second half of 1981, when the current account
deficit had become a serious imbalance, the private demand for consumption and
                                                
6  Note that comparisons with the levels of output and income, as well as with measures of the real exchange
rate and real wages, in 1975 are misleading: their values at that time reflected the depression brought about
by the sharp deterioration of the terms of trade when the country had yet to recover from the policies of the
Allende government.14
investment declined rapidly, and by the end of the year Chile was entering into the
recession that precipitated the 1981-83 banking crisis.
The banking system played a key role in the euphoria of 1980-81.  In addition to
deepening their role in the intermediation of domestic funds, the national banks were a
main mechanism for mobilizing foreign funds to private business and households (before
the crisis, foreign banks never threatened the position of national banks).  By the end of
1981, the stock of bank credit to the private sector (including business and households) had
increased to over 45 percent of GDP, almost twice its level of mid 1979 (see table 2.6
above).  The increase in domestic liabilities and the decline in bank lending to the public
sector accounted for at least 70 percent of the increase in bank lending to the private sector.
The rest of the funds were from foreign loans: the share of foreign liabilities in the total
liabilities of banks increased from around 17 percent in mid 1979, to just over 30 percent at
the end of 1981.
Until mid 1980, the (flow) supply of domestic funds to the banks had been increasing,
but then it started to decline when the (flow) demand for bank credit was still increasing.
Contrary to what happened in 1976-79,
7 the growing demand for bank credit was due
mainly to investments in a variety of new projects to produce tradable goods—most with
long maturation periods—as well as in commercial buildings, housing and other durable
goods.  The growing gap between the two flows could not be funded by foreign credit,
however, and the declining trend in domestic interest rates of the previous four years came
to an end in late 1980. During 1981, ex post real rates on loans increased sharply, to over 40
percent per year (Figure 2.1), but how much ex ante rates increased depends on
expectations about changes in relative prices.  In 1981, all indexes were showing low
inflation or even deflation, but more important, once again they were showing changes in
relative prices much larger than anticipated.
                                                
7 In this period the demand for credit was mainly driven by a strong competition for taking over assets and
enterprises.15
Figure 2.1
C. Back to depression (1982-86)
The government and the crisis
The sharp decline in the private demand for consumption and investment brought
about a rapid decline in output and income. The decline took place mainly in 1982, but it
bottomed out in late 1983.  By then, output and income per capita were at 85 and 75 percent
of their levels in the late 1960s, respectively. The new depression triggered immediate
pressures on the government to change its policies or at least to provide relief to sectors that
had suffered income losses. The government’s initial reaction was to reiterate its
commitment to free market policies and therefore not to intervene at all: demands for
government’s intervention were denounced as motivated only by sectoral or group interests,
and replied with requests for business to adjust quickly to the new market conditions.  But
the possibility of a government’s bailout of distressed enterprises and farmers blocked the
prospect for an automatic adjustment to the new conditions. The new Constitution
notwithstanding, the military government had the power to bail them out, so the only doubt
was about its willingness to do it.
















































































The government finally intervened.  First, on June 14 1982, it decided to abandon the
fixed exchange rate policy.  The decision implied a devaluation of the peso which in the
following three months—until a crawling peg rule became credible—depreciated by 60
percent (from 39 to 63 Chilean pesos per US dollar).  This policy was supposed to benefit
the activities affected by the deterioration in the terms of trade, but it increased greatly the
burden of servicing foreign debt.  Hence, it forced the first large debt relief program based
on a preferential exchange rate.  Second, on January 13 1983, the government decided to
deal directly with the financial crisis and opted for providing relief to distressed debtors of
the financial system and assistance to banks to restore their solvency, and for forcing the
closure and takeover of several banks.  Other measures would follow soon.  The relief to
debtors and the assistance to banks implied a large government expenditure financed largely
by the issue of bonds to be placed with domestic investors, in particular the new pension
funds.  By then, as all other Latin American countries, Chile did not have access to foreign
investors.
The causes of the crisis: a simple model
The rationale and in particular the sequencing of government policies were
conditioned by the diagnosis of the crisis and the political developments precipitated by the
crisis.  Economic policymakers believed that external shocks and some excessive risk
taking by the grupos economicos were the main causes of the crisis, and they accepted
reluctantly to intervene, mainly to accommodate political pressures.  Only for a short period
of time, between April 1984 and early 1985, policymakers sympathetic to the economic
reforms of the late 1970s and early 1980s were forced out of office.  In that short period,
because of increasing political pressures, the new policymakers attempted to accelerate the
recovery of the economy, but they aborted their policies quickly as international reserves
were depleted, and the military government appointed another group of policymakers
sympathetic to the economic reforms.
The debate about the causes of the depression has yet to provide conclusive evidence
about the relevance of several ideas.  However, a simple model can help to identify the
main forces leading to the crisis.  Let us assume that the private sector consists of three
groups.  New owners which borrow to finance their investments; former owners which sell
their property and deposit the proceeds in banks; and workers which earn a salary from the
new owners by producing two goods, one exportable and the other nontradable (the
importable good is produced only abroad). To be sustainable, an increase in aggregate
demand for consumption and investment depends on the rapid growth of the new owners’
disposable income, the only group running a deficit.  The deficit is financed with two debts,
one to be paid back only with the importable good (the foreign debt) and the other one with
any good (the domestic debt).  The interest rates on both debts are variable.  If new owners’
expectations about the income from their investments turn to be wrong—because lower
than expected output prices or higher than expected interest rates or wages, or any other
reason—then sooner or later the new owners would face a solvency problem.  Moreover, if
the world price of the exportable good declines, the new owners will earn a lower than
expected income, and their debt burden will increase because of the need to produce more
of the exportable good to service their foreign debt.17
In that simple model, without the initial deficit and the related accumulation of debt,
there cannot be financial distress.  But if there is distress, the motivation of borrowers (in
Chile, new owners’ optimistic expectations which by definition are to be frustrated) and the
judgement of lenders (in Chile, bad judgement due to regulatory deficiencies and failures of
market discipline) can be its cause. The cause can also be an event leading to lower than
expected income for debtors to repay their debts timely (in Chile, the external shock that led
to a large increase in the real interest rate on foreign debt, or the higher than expected
increase in real wages due to their indexation to past inflation when inflation was
declining).  Or it can be a decline in the terms of trade bringing about both a lower than
expected income and a higher than expected debt burden (in Chile, the decline in the world
prices of copper and other exportable goods relative to the prices of oil and other
importable goods).  Except for the increase in real wages,
8 all other factors could have
caused Chile’s crisis.
Devaluation, relative prices and financial distress
The model highlights the importance of relative prices and real wages.  The terms of
trade, the real exchange rate and real wages fluctuated greatly in the 1970s and early 1980s.
In Chile’s history, there had been several episodes of unsustainable levels of domestic
demand for goods and services or negative real shocks, corrected by a large depreciation of
the real exchange rate (and a large decline in real wages since the two were closely related).
In these episodes, the depreciation of the real exchange rate was the result of a devaluation
of the official exchange rate, and not surprisingly, in late 1981 and early 1982, there were
calls for abandoning the fixed exchange rate set in June 1979. The government’s initial
reaction was to wait for a decline in nominal wages.  Contrary to previous experiences in
Chile, when the public sector was the major debtor in foreign currency, the devaluation of
the peso was expected to increase the debt service burden of the private sector—in
particular, of the new owners not producing the exportable good or whose investments in
the exportable sector had yet to generate income (both were significant, especially the
latter). This was an additional argument for relying on a decline in nominal wages to force a
change in relative prices
9, but market forces were not enough to force a reduction in
nominal wages.  The old inflationary bias of the Chilean economy was still alive: changes
in relative prices had to occur only through increases in some nominal prices.  Not
surprisingly, the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate policy in 1982 strengthened the
inflationary bias responsible for Chile’s high inflation rate since then  (Table 2.5).
The devaluation of the peso in June 1982 led to a depreciation of the real exchange
rate and lower real wages, but at the cost of increasing sharply the debt service burden of
the new owners.  Even if the devaluation mitigated the conflict between the new owners
                                                
8  Although the increase in real wages was much higher than the amount determined by indexation, part of its
effect on labor costs was offset by lower labor taxes.  The government had been reducing these taxes
gradually in the two years previous to the implementation of the pension reform in May 1981.
9 Actually, the devaluation of the peso would have increased the political pressures on the government from
the groups suffering losses, while a wage deflation would have had a smaller (or more indirect) effect on
this regard.18
and workers, it aggravated the conflict between the new owners and their creditors, that is,
the old owners and foreign banks.  There was no mechanism for creditors to force the
repayment of their claims—bankruptcy proceedings had not been reformed yet and they
could only handle the few cases of normal times.  Thus, the new owners could default
without taking the risk of losing control of their assets and enterprises.  It was in the context
of this conflict that government intervention to solve the debt problem should be
understood.  Banks could not handle the restructuring of the debts of a large number of new
owners—despite some concentration of bank credit in the business conglomerates or
grupos economicos—especially when some banks were representing the interests of their
new owners rather than those of their creditors.
The banking crisis
The focus on resolving expediently the conflict between new owners and their
creditors explains government’s delay to address the structural weaknesses of the banking
system.  Although the crisis was the result mainly of macroeconomic forces, there was a
need to address the structural weaknesses of the banking system.  Thus, only in 1986, after
most programs aimed at dealing with the outstanding debts of 1982 had already been
implemented, the government started the reform of the banking law and other regulations
with the idea of setting new processes to deal with problem banks.  Between 1982 and
1986, the government controlled the banking business tightly to prevent that its intervention
would create a moral hazard problem, and its control substituted for any weaknesses in the
system developed between 1975 and 1981.
Large portfolio shifts, in particular runs against some banks, did not play an important
role in the crisis.  Contrary to other experiences, in Chile soon it became clear that the
ultimate cause of the pervasive distress of banks and other financial institutions was the
rapid slowdown of the economy after two years of euphoria, and that the government was
capable of handling the crisis.  Before January 1983, the threat of a large portfolio shift
perhaps deterred or delayed government intervention.  There were, however, several
instances in which this intervention could have precipitated a shift but it did not happen (for
example, when two large banks were intervened in November 1981, just at the beginning of
the depression).  But in January 1983, the government did not want to take the risk of a run
against banks and explicitly guaranteed all their deposits.
Nor losses of international reserves due to capital flight were significant.  There was a
loss of reserves first in the three months after the devaluation of the peso in June 1982, and
then again in January 1983, because of the conflict between the government and the foreign
banks. This conflict was precipitated by the government’s attempt to impose a loss
equivalent to 30 percent of their claims, on all depositors and other creditors of the banks
forced into liquidation. However, foreign banks blocked this attempt by not renewing their
trade credit lines to Chile.  In a few weeks the loss of international reserves amounted to
over US$1 billion, but once it was agreed that foreign banks were not going to take a loss,
trade credit quickly recovered its level of late 1982.19
Chile’s banking crisis followed a long period of high real interest rates in which the
Central Bank could do little to lower them.  The four-year declining trend of real interest
rates was reversed in the last quarter of 1980.  Then the rates increased at least until mid
1982. Only in early 1983, they started to decline again after the government began
controlling them (see figure 2.1 above).  At some point in late 1981 or early 1982, it
became clear that banks were caught in a sort of Ponzi game: for most short-term loans,
they were rolling over principal and capitalizing interest.  It was not a rational game
between borrowers and lenders (there was no reason to believe that capital and interest
could be rollover for ever), but the result of their belief that sooner or later the government
would have no choice but to bail them out.  As long as the game kept going, the depression
deepened, and only in late 1983, when government intervention was well advanced,
conditions became favorable for production and employment to recover.
Initially the recovery was slow.  It depended on the new owners’ ability to generate
the cash flow needed to finance the accumulation of working capital.  Given their
indebtedness, and as long as the government was concerned about the quality of the loan
portfolios of banks, those owners could hardly qualify for new bank credit. Indeed the
recovery was too slow to relieve the political pressure on the government. The economic
constraints to accelerate it—in particular, the persistent low terms of trade and limited
access to foreign capital as well as the persistent fragility of the banking system—were well
known to be ignored.  The failed attempt of mid 1984 sent a clear message about the
consequences of ignoring the constraints, and the government did not attempt to accelerate
the recovery again.  The recovery continued then at a slow pace but on sound bases—
including the maturation of the pre-crisis investments in tradable goods and the reforms of
the pension and income tax systems.  When the international context changed for good,
Chile was in a strong position to grow at high rates.20
3. RESOLUTION OF THE BANKING CRISIS
A. Government intervention
The 1982-84 financial crisis was resolved through a series of measures implemented
by the government that were aimed at rehabilitating the financial system. In particular,
specific measures were taken to improve the repayment capacity of debtors, and to give
banks and finance companies more time and the incentives to rebuild their portfolios and
their capital base. In addition, several financial institutions were put under government
provisional administration and later on returned to private management, while some non-
viable financial institutions were liquidated so that they would free resources to be allocated
to more productive uses.
This section analyses in detail, in subsections 3.B thru 3.G, all the measures taken
since 1981 to address the different problems that appeared as the crisis unfolded. The
approach used consists of looking—to the extent allowed by data availability—at
microeconomic evidence to assess the rationale for, and the effects of, the different
government actions. For this purpose we analyze the performance prior to the crisis, and the
effect of the different government policies during and after the crisis, of three separate
groups of financial institutions, namely, foreign, domestic intervened, and domestic non-
intervened. The three groups together comprise all financial institutions operating in Chile
in each year. Intervened institutions are pooled together although they were intervened in
different years. The institutions included in each group are listed in tables A.1 thru A.3 in
the annexes (the sub-periods are due to different formats of the financial statements
published by banks and finance companies). Some institutions disappear from the sample
because of liquidation or merger.
It is important to note that many of the measures taken had a significant effect on the
consolidated public sector budget and its financing. However, in the analysis that follows
we ignore the macro effects—in particular, the impact on the Central Bank’s monetary
base—of all these measures and how the macroeconomic equilibria were maintain.
B. The loan portfolios
Until the end of 1981, the loan portfolios of banks (including both banks and financial
companies) had been growing at high real rates (Table 3.1.A).  As of the end of 1981, their
credit to the private sector amounted to over 45 percent of 1981 GDP, and as shown in
Table 3.1.B, the share of intervened banks in the total loan portfolio had increased up to 55
percent, largely at the expense of nonintervened banks.  Although in the three years up to
the end of 1981, the loan portfolios of foreign banks had been growing at higher rates than
that of national banks, they still accounted for only 5 percent of the total loan portfolio.
Most of that bank credit had been given to private companies for commercial purposes, but
the shares of mortgage loans for housing and consumption loans mainly for durable goods
had been increasing rapidly.21
Table 3.1.A Growth by type of  institution
Total Loans Growth (%) Deposits Growth (%) Equity Growth (%)
1980-79 1981-80 1980-79 1981-80 1980-79 1981-80
Foreign 93.1 64.3 46.9 75.0 28.2 31.4
Intervened 64.4 39.3 37.2 58.7 25.6 30.4
Non-intervened 34.1 26.5 23.0 41.2 12.3 8.2
Table 3.1.B Market share by type of institution
Assets 1979 1980 1981
Foreign 4.0% 4.7% 5.9%
Non-intervened 46.0% 41.8% 37.8%
Intervened 50.0% 53.4% 56.3%
Loans 1979 1980 1981
Foreign 3.4% 4.4% 5.3%
Non-intervened 46.7% 41.4% 38.8%
Intervened 49.8% 54.2% 55.9%
Deposits 1979 1980 1981
Foreign 3.9% 4.4% 5.1%
Non-intervened 46.4% 43.6% 40.6%
Intervened 49.7% 52.0% 54.4%
Equity 1979 1980 1981
Foreign 9.7% 10.4% 11.3%
Non-intervened 45.0% 42.2% 37.7%
Intervened 45.3% 47.4% 51.1%
By the end of 1981, the balance sheets of private companies and households had
already started to show the impact of a year-long period of high real interest rates, a decline
in real estate prices, and a rapid slowdown in the growth rates of output and disposable
income.  The levels of indebtedness of corporations and all other types of companies had
been increasing during 1981, but even at the end of the year, they were not high enough to
claim that most were in any sense overindebted. Indeed, an analysis of the financial
statements of corporations shows that at the end of 1981, the debt-to equity ratios of firms
in the tradable and non-tradable sectors were, on average, 0.64 and 0.44, respectively
(Hernández and Walker, 1993). Businesses other than corporations could have hardly
incurred in greater indebtedness because of their limited access to bank credit. Also, the net
worth of households had started to decline in late 1981, but at the end of the year the loss
was not yet significant.  Their indebtedness was much lower than that of companies and
real estate prices had declined at most 10 percent in relation to the peak level of mid 1981.
9
By the end of 1982, however, the crisis was fully reflected in the balance sheets of
companies and households—by the end of 1982, the debt-to equity ratios of firms in the
tradable and non-tradable sectors had increased to 1.1 and 0.76, respectively (Hernández
and Walker, 1993). In addition to the income losses from lower terms of trade and higher
                                                
9  Stock prices increased rapidly until July 1980, when the Chief of the Securities Commission stated
publicly that there was no reason for the prices to be that high.  Even at that time the stock market was a
minor component of the financial system, and new issues of securities accounted for a negligible share of
the financing of private investment. Furthermore, while by the last quarter of 1981 the price of houses
had fallen by 33 percent with respect to their peak in 1981:Q2, the price of land had increased by 22
percent. Indeed, the price of land kept increasing until 1982:Q2 (Morandé and Soto, 1992).22
international interest rates, there were losses from lower output and employment.
Producers of exportable goods benefited from the devaluation, but the effect was partly
offset by the higher debt burden; and only the government clearly benefited because the
increased revenue from copper production exceeded any loss from its low level of foreign
indebtedness.
10  Also, the operational losses were compounded by capital losses from lower
asset prices relative to domestic debt and especially relative to foreign debt (Hernández and
Walker, 1993).  By then some companies and households were insolvent, but it was hardly
the condition of most of them.
The increasing financial distress of companies and households affected rapidly the
solvency of national banks because they had been the main source of debt capital. The
effect was due to the lower ability to service the debts, but more important, to a strong
reluctance to service them based on the expectation of a government’s bail out.
11 Although
the deterioration of loan portfolios took a long time to be reflected accurately in the income
statements and balance sheets of banks, it was well known that the impact had been
significant. Since the main indicators of the deterioration of loan portfolios were not
reliable, it was not clear how each bank had been affected. In December 1982, the level of
provisions for the entire system was commensurate with that of non-performing loans, but
the latter still amounted to only 2.5 percent of total loans. Although at that date—except for
Banco del Estado—all banks showed low provisions, subsequent developments showed that
national banks had been the most affected by the crisis and that their provisions were
largely insufficient (Table 3.2). In sum, the information available for the government
intervention—in 1982 or earlier—was poor and likely affected its timing and details.
Table 3.2
(A) Non-performing assets (net of transfers to the CB) as a share of total assets (%)
December 1981 December 1982 March 1983
Domestic Banks 1.71 2.31 8.40
Foreign Banks 2.25 2.00 1.88
Banco del Estado 1.72 3.96 3.54
Total 1.74 2.56 6.72
(B) Provisions as a share of total assets (%)
December 1981 December 1982 March 1983
Domestic Banks 0.80 1.78 3.25
Foreign Banks 0.88 1.26 1.10
Banco del Estado 3.23 4.06 4.33
Total 1.31 2.11 3.15
                                                
10 Actually, in 1980 and early 1981, the Central Bank prepaid part of its foreign debt.  This debt had been
contracted by the Central Bank on behalf of the government at nominal interest rates much lower than
those prevailing in 1980-81. Indeed, while total medium and long-term debt increased on average by
about US$2.5 billion per year during 1980-81, private debt increased by US$2.7 billion (Table A.4 in the
annexes).
11 This can be inferred from press reports published at that time.23
(C) Past Due Loans over total loans (%), Banks and Financial Companies
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
1.6 1.1 2.3 4.1 8.4 8.9 3.5
Sources: Panels (A) and (B), Revista Gestión, June 1983; panel (c) G.Held (1989).
During 1981 and given the increasing distress of their debtors, banks were expected
to restructure debts voluntarily, in particular short-term debts denominated in pesos.
Actually, banks with access to foreign credit had been transforming these short-term debts
into long-term debts denominated in US dollars. A large part of the short-term debt had
been used to finance investments in fixed capital, and at the time of contracting the debts,
borrowers expected to transform them rapidly. Although the declining trend in real interest
rates of short term loans and the increasing supply of foreign credit had led to the
expectation that their costs would eventually converge, in 1980 and 1981, most borrowers
preferred to be indebted long term, even if denominated in a foreign currency.  The
preference was motivated by the expectation that the government would keep the exchange
rate fixed at the rate of 39 pesos per dollar, but also by the expectation of rates of return on
investments that would exceed greatly the expected cost of long-term debts denominated in
US dollars.  However, in late 1981, most banks were struggling with the rollover of short-
term debts, and their main concern was how much of the interest payment to capitalize as
part of the rollover.  To restructure debts banks did not have access to sources of long term
funds other than foreign credit, and when access to foreign credit became increasingly
difficult—before Mexico declared a moratorium of its foreign debt in August—that
transformation had all but stopped.
Thus, the government was pressed to intervene, in particular to facilitate the
restructuring of debts.  In this section, three sets of programs are discussed.  The first one,
perhaps the most important one, was aimed at restructuring debts denominated in US
dollars and was precipitated by the devaluation of the peso in June 1982.  The second one
consists of programs aimed at providing relief to several groups of debtors.  And the third
one includes the series of programs that allowed the banks to sell their substandard loans to
the Central Bank.
(1) The preferential exchange rate program for repaying debts
Because of the large impact of the devaluation of the Chilean peso on the balance
sheets of corporations, households and other debtors, in mid 1982 the government was
urged to provide relief by allowing debtors to buy the foreign exchange to service their
foreign debts at a preferential rate. The government’s scheme implied a large subsidy to
debtors whose debts were denominated in a foreign currency (mainly the US dollar).  As
shown in Figure 3.1, until September 1984, the average level of the subsidy was equivalent
to around 17 percent of the debt service (or 17 cents per US dollar of each payment of
capital and interest).  After the devaluation of September 1984 and until the scheme was
ended in June 1985, the subsidy increased to around 35 percent of the debt service.  Given
the initial levels of the foreign debt of both banks and non-financial companies, it is not24
surprising that its fiscal cost amounted to the large annual amounts shown in Figure 3.2,
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Source: Eyzaguirre and Larrañaga (1991).
                                                
12 The cost is calculated based on actual cash flows (losses) incurred by the Central Bank because of this
program (the annual figures are divided by each year GDP).25
The subsidy benefited only debtors who contracted their loans with foreign creditors
(directly or indirectly through a bank) in accordance with the provisions of Article 14 of the
Foreign Exchange Transactions Law.  Since these debts were registered with the Central
Bank, it was relatively simple to implement the subsidy, and more important to ensure its
effectiveness.  The government opted to pay it cash through the Central Bank, but later on
the subsidy—for large debtors—was paid with a bond issued by the Central Bank that could
be sold in the secondary market. This change was aimed at minimizing the monetary effect
and to reduce the size of the subsidy. The subsidy was paid at the time that debtors were
obliged to buy foreign exchange to repay their debts.
The controversy about its justification notwithstanding, the subsidy was a cost-
effective way to deal with the impact of the devaluation on the debt burden.  If the
devaluation of the peso was the only instrument for achieving a new set of equilibrium
relative prices and if default on the foreign debt was not an option, then the subsidy
achieved its objective of ensuring the repayment of the foreign debt at a small
administrative cost. If, to mitigate its redistributive effect, the subsidy had been conditioned
on the transfer of ownership or control of assets to the government or a third party, it would
have hardly achieved its objective and its administrative cost would have been much higher.
(2) Debt restructuring programs
By late 1981, some interest groups started to press the government for relief
assistance to service their debts.  They consisted of companies (including farmers) that had
suffered or claimed to have suffered a large income loss due to changes in relative prices
and the slowdown of economic activity.  The rapid deterioration of the economy made
evident, however, that the problem was not limited to some areas or activities, and that a
concession to any particular group would lead quickly to similar demands by many other
groups.  The pressures continued growing, however, and not surprisingly the devaluation of
June 1982 with its large impact on relative prices reinforced the idea that some sectors of
the economy had already been hit hard.
The first government program for restructuring commercial debts was announced in
August 1982. It provided debtors with loans to repay up to 30 percent of their outstanding
debts with the banking system. With a total amount of US$250 million (equivalent to 0.96
percent of 1982 GDP), the main objective of the program was just to transform short-term
debts into debts with maturities between three and five years. The interest rates of the new
loans were not low (LIBOR+6 percent on dollar-denominated loans, and UF+16.5 percent
on peso-denominated loans) but implied a large subsidy for the debtors because their cost of
capital at that time was much higher.
13 Soon, in October 1982, another similar program was
implemented with a total amount of US$320 million but only for peso-denominated debts
(by then the preferential exchange rate program discussed above had already been
implemented), but the interest rate was lowered to UF+12 percent.  (In the first program,
the Central Bank issued money and lent it directly to the debtors who, in turn, paid back
their loans to the banks. In the second program, however, the Central Bank issued money to
                                                
13  The notation UF+ is to indicate that the principal is indexed (with one-month lag) to the CPI through the
Unidad de Fomento, UF, so the interest rate is (almost) a real one.26
buy long term bonds from the banks and then the banks used these funds to restructure the
debts.)
The two programs set three conditions that were repeated in subsequent programs.
First, they were intended not to benefit the main debtors of the banking system because it
was in the self-interest of each bank to restructure the debts of its main debtors.  Thus, the
ceiling on the amount of restructured loans was equivalent to US$500,000
14. Second, only
viable companies could benefit.  This condition was expected to force the banks first to
separate their business debtors into viable and nonviable, and then to initiate legal action
against the latter to recover the funds or to take over the collateral.  Finally, only debts of
productive companies, that is, those producing goods and services (that is, empresas con
chimenea) could be restructured, explicitly excluding the debts of investment companies
(that is, empresas de papel) holding shares in the productive companies.  It is not known the
extent to which the first two conditions were effectively enforced—in particular, at that
time the banks could hardly distinguish between viable and nonviable debtors—but the
third one should have been easy to enforce.
The two programs were not enough to relieve the pressure on the government,
however.  First in April 1983 and then in June 1984, new programs to restructure debts
were announced.  The 1983 program attempted to give more relief to small businesses; it
provided for the restructuring of 30 percent of the outstanding debt with banks but up to a
maximum amount equivalent to US$104,000.  The 1984 program was aimed at medium
size businesses: the maximum amount to be rescheduled was increased up to the equivalent
of US$1,206,000.  In relation to the 1982 programs, the last two programs provided the
debtors with much better terms for restructuring their debts, including lower real interest
rates, grace periods for repayment and longer maturities.  Also, the last two programs did
not imply an increase in the monetary base because the funds given by the Central Bank to
the banks had to be invested in Central Bank’s bonds as required by the targets of the
monetary programs agreed with the International Monetary Fund.
15  The banks benefited
greatly from this arrangement because they earned interest at the rate of UF+12 percent per
year on Central Bank’s risk-free bonds, as the rate was intentionally set high to improve the
profitability of the banks.
16
In comparison with the restructuring of commercial debts, the restructuring of
mortgage debts did not pose serious problems. Given the variety of terms in the original
loan contracts and the differences in the economic and financial conditions of the debtors,
the restructuring of commercial debts required some discretion for the banks to assess the
viability of their debtors. In the case of mortgage debts, however, the terms of the original
loans were quite standard, with any important differences in the economic conditions of the
debtors being reflected in the amount of the loans. To restructure mortgage loans, creditor
                                                
14 It was established that only debts up to Ch$35MM would be eligible for rescheduling under these
conditions.
15  In 1982, Chile did not have a formal program with the IMF, but it agreed to meet some monetary targets.
In early 1983, it agreed on a formal program that was renewed annually until 1989.
16 In other words, the monetary expansion was sterilized with CB bonds sold to commercial banks. The
bonds yield was set at 12 percent real.27
banks were constrained by the lack of long term funds and by the high cost of doing it case
by case. The pressure on the government to provide relief to mortgage debtors increased
sharply in early 1983, when the effects of the devaluation of the peso on relative prices and
real wages, and therefore on inflation, were fully realized (and when unemployment rose
significantly). In addition to a large capital loss—for many debtors nominal prices of real
estate had declined sharply, while their outstanding debts stayed constant because those
were indexed to the CPI through the UF—the depression had brought about a large decline
in all labor incomes.
In June 1983, the government announced a program to restructure mortgage debts.  It
amounted to a loan for debtors to reduce their next 48 monthly payments (dividendos).  It
started with a 40 percent discount in the first 12 payments, then 30 percent in the second 12
payments, 20 percent in the third 12 payments, and finally 10 percent in the remaining 12
payments.  It also reduced the monthly payments that had become past due in the last 24
months. The Central Bank lent funds to commercial banks at the interest rate of UF+7
percent per year, and the banks were to relent the funds to the mortgage debtors at the rate
of UF+8 percent per year, so the banks could finance the restructuring costs with the
differential.  Mortgage debtors were to start to pay back the Central Bank’s loan at the end
of the 48 months. In June 1984 the program provided additional relief for debtors with
mortgages up to about US$127,000.  In particular, it extended the maturity of the Central
Bank’s loan up to the maturity of the original mortgage, and reduced its interest rate to
UF+4 percent per year.  Later, in March 1986, a new program was introduced similar to the
modified version of the first one—for mortgages up to the ceiling above—but in addition
debtors were given the option to choose the indexation clause of the Central Bank’s loan.
Two other minor restructuring programs were also implemented.  First, as part of the
relief measures of May 1983, a program was set to restructure the debts of transportation
companies that had borrowed to buy commercial vehicles, including trucks, buses and taxis.
Second, as part of the relief measures of June 1984, some funds were provided to
restructure some consumption loans.
The subsidies given through the debt restructuring programs benefited the debtors of
the intervened financial institutions, and to a lesser extent the debtors of foreign and non-
intervened banks. This corroborates the fact that the intervened institutions had lent more to
riskier creditors or projects, or to creditors in sectors more prone to be affected by the
macroeconomic cycle or by the change in relative prices—i.e., movements in the real
exchange rate (Figure 3.3).28
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Note: Stgo&Chile stand for Banco Santiago and Banco de Chile, the two largest private banks of the
Chilean financial system, which were among the institutions intervened in January 1983.
The fiscal cost of all restructuring programs is shown in Figure 3.4
17. Although lower
than that of the preferential exchange rate, the cost was significant. While the preferential
exchange rate program was justified by the high cost of defaulting on the foreign debt, the
debt restructuring programs were justified by the high cost of a massive default of the
domestic debt.  At some point in the crisis the government had no choice but to provide
relief, but in mid 1981, when the crisis was yet to start, there was little else that the
government could have done to persuade debtors and creditors that it would not bail them
out. The institutions of law and government failed to prevent the euphoria of 1980 and
1981, and not surprisingly, they were even less appropriate to deal with a massive conflict
between debtors and creditors precipitated by the prospect of a long period of high
international and national interest rates. The conflict was exacerbated by the deteriorating
economic situation and raising unemployment which, in turn, raised expectations –and
increased the pressure– for a government bailout. These expectations delayed the payment
of some debts, further deteriorating the overall situation.
18 The bail out through the
preferential exchange rate program and the debt restructuring programs were the
consequence of these pressures, and as schemes to bail out the debtors, the latter were not
as cost effective as the former.
19 Partly this was due to the inherent difficulties of designing
debt restructuring programs—especially in the case of commercial debts—and because the
need for flexibility (as reflected in the fine tuning of the programs once they were
implemented) contributed to aggravate the moral hazard of government intervention.
                                                
17 The cost estimate is based on actual cash flow transfers from the Central Bank to borrowers (Source,
Sanhueza, 1998).
18 Press reports at the time indicate that many solvent debtors were delaying the repayment of their debts as
they expected (al least) a partial bail out from the government.
19 The administrative cost per peso transferred to debtors was very low in the preferential exchange rate
program.29
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Sources: Marshall and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994) and Sanhueza (1998).
(3) The sale of non-performing loans to the Central Bank
Since late 1981, the government had been urged to alleviate the financial distress of
banks.  In early 1982, some actions were taken to facilitate the recognition by banks of their
loan losses: authorization to record as past due loans that had been in arrears for 90 days
(the traditional standard was 30 days); additional time to build up provisions to cover loan
losses; and a special 5-year period to recognize losses from the sale of assets taken over
from debtors.  They were not enough, however, and in July 1982, the government instructed
the Central Bank
20 to purchase substandard loans—overdue loans, loans classified as D, and
connected loans—from banks. This action would be the beginning of several similar
programs.
The initial program was intended only to be an accounting procedure to provide banks
with an incentive to clean up their balance sheets.  The Central Bank was to purchase loans
at face value and to pay the banks with a promissory note maturing in ten years but paying
no interest.  Banks could sell loans for up to 150 percent of their capital, subject to the
obligation of repurchasing the substandard loans pari passu with the payment of the
promissory note by the Central Bank, and the non-distribution of profits (dividends) until
they had repurchased all of the loans.  Although no transfer of resources was involved,
banks benefited from the sale of loans to the Central Bank because they did not need to
provision against these loans and they could free any provision already made. The
government expected that it would be enough incentive for banks to stop the rollover of
loans and to accelerate the classification of debtors into viable and nonviable.  Substandard
loans would then increase sharply, including loans to related parties.
                                                
20 At the time the Central Bank was not autonomous.30
The program was not as successful as the government had expected, however.  By the
end of September 1982, only 62 percent of the substandard loans reported at the end of June
1982 had been sold to the Central Bank.  By the end of December, it increased to 91
percent.  Since the amount reported at the end of June underestimated grossly the actual
conditions of loan portfolios, the program had failed to clean up banks’ balance sheets.  The
failure has been attributed to the uncertainty about the consequences of not being able to
repurchase the loans in accordance with the payment schedule of the promissory note.
Given the poor prospect of a rapid recovery in cash flows and profits, the owners were not
ready yet to take the risk of losing the control and management of their banks.  Also, banks
were still reluctant to stop rolling over loans because it would have forced them to start
legal action against delinquent debtors, when it was still likely that the government could
provide additional relief to debtors
21.
As part of the government take over of eight financial institutions in January 1983,
the original program began to be expanded greatly, with significant changes occurring
through the rest of the decade. First, banks were given more time to sell substandard loans
to the Central Bank—the deadline was extended several times. Second, the maximum
amount of loans that a bank was allowed to sell to the Central Bank was raised from 1.5 to
2.5 times a bank’s capital, and later on to 3.5 times. Third, the responsibility for
repurchasing the loans from the Central Bank out of profits was shifted from the banks to
their original shareholders, so new investors could capitalize the banks without being
responsible for the obligation to repurchase the loans. Fourth, the Central Bank started to
pay part of the purchase of substandard loans (up to 60 percent) with a 4-year promissory
note accruing interest at the rate of UF+7 percent per year.  For this part of the loans the
banks’ obligation to repurchase them was to accrue interest at the rate of UF+5 percent per
year—therefore, the program could also be considered as swap with the Central Bank with
a return (spread) of 2 percentage points.
The expansion of the program also strengthened the rules for the administration of the
loans sold to the Central Bank. The loans were left with the original banks for their
administration and collection of payments. All collections had to be applied to the
repurchase of the loans, and borrowers were not informed that their loans had been sold to
the Central Bank to prevent that they could take advantage of the fact that their banks were
no longer holding the titles.
With the new rules, banks (especially, the two large banks intervened in January
1983) had good incentives to sell all their substandard loans.  In addition to benefiting from
not having to provision against these loans, they benefited from the interest rate differential
of 2 percentage points between the interest earned on the Central Bank’s promissory note (7
percent) and the interest paid on the obligation to repurchase the substandard loans from the
                                                
21 Even if the government was able to prevent the holding companies of the conglomerates from benefiting
from the debt restructuring programs, their creditor banks could continue the rollover of their short-term
loans and finance the service of their long-term loans because of the increased availability of funds.31
Central Bank (5 percent).  Even if the actual difference was lower than 2 percentage points,
it was a spread high enough to improve profitability.
22
Figure 3.5



































































Note: Stgo&Chile stand for Banco Santiago and Banco de Chile, the two largest private banks of the
Chilean financial system, which were among the institutions intervened in January 1983.
In 1983 and 1984, a large amount of loans were sold to the Central Bank, and some
more in 1985 (afterwards, the stock of these loans declined as the banks started to
repurchased them).  There were, however, important differences in the amounts sold by
nonintervened, intervened and foreign banks, a reflection of differences in their initial
conditions but also in government policies (figure 3.5). The relaxation of the rules for
selling loans notwithstanding, banks were constrained to sell loans by their low capital base.
In particular, for intervened banks, the restriction on the maximum amount of loans that
could be sold to the Central Bank was binding and the government had to force their
recapitalization.  Moreover, the government often made adjustments in the rules that
allowed the banks to get a better deal, either by increasing the net payments to the banks, or
by delaying the repurchase of the loans. At some point later in the process banks were given
a share on the proceeds from the recovery of the substandard loans that had been sold to the
Central Bank. This measure was aimed at improving the recovery of these loans that were
administered by the banks.
                                                
22 The actual gain for banks was lower than 2 percent since they also had to use the 4-year promissory notes
to repay CB emergency loans which in turn were at below market rates.32
C. The domestic liabilities
Starting in early 1980, the composition of the total liabilities of the banking system
changed rapidly (see Table 3.3).  At the beginning, over 70 percent of its liabilities were
with the public in the form of demand, savings and time deposits and also bonds.  By the
end of 1981, at the beginning of the crisis, the share of these domestic liabilities had
declined to around 63 percent because banks were able to access foreign credit, which at
that time accounted for 30 percent of total liabilities.  By the end of 1983, at the bottom of
the depression, the liabilities with the public had declined to 43 percent of total liabilities as
a result of the large increase in the liabilities with the Central Bank, which then accounted
for 25 percent of total liabilities. Until the end of 1986, the liabilities with the Central Bank
continued to account for a high share, in the range of 25-30 percent of the total. In the crisis,
the Central Bank played the role of intermediary because it mobilized domestic funds by
issuing bonds and recycling some of the foreign debt originally contracted by private banks
and companies.
Table 3.3
Sources of funds: share by type 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989
Demand, Savings and Time Deposits 71.9% 63.1% 43.1% 39.0% 52.8% 68.2%
Other domestic liabilities 9.5% 6.3% 25.4% 30.3% 23.6% 16.8%
Loans from abroad and other foreign liabilities 18.6% 30.6% 31.5% 30.7% 23.6% 15.0%
That decline in the share of domestic liabilities with the public notwithstanding, their
real value did not decline during the crisis.  There was often a fear that other liabilities
could substitute for them; first, when the access to foreign credit increased sharply before
the crisis, and later during the crisis, when it was possible to have access to the Central
Bank.  Indeed, there were changes in the sources of the domestic liabilities with the public,
in the type of liabilities and in their allocation by type of banks.  Few changes were
significant however; perhaps the most important one was the investment of the funds of the
new pension system in time deposits with maturities longer than the average maturity of
household deposits. Until January 1983, except for small depositors there was no explicit
government’s guarantee of the liabilities with the public (the voluntary system of deposit
insurance set in late 1981 never became important). But when the government decided to
liquidate 2 banks and 1 finance company it had no choice but to offer an explicit guarantee.
The guarantee of the total amount of deposits was regarded an effective deterrence of a run
against the remaining banks that were intervened but were not to be liquidated.
If the government’s guarantee was important for preventing a run against the banks,
the Central Bank’s role in the intermediation and recycling of funds was important for
maintaining the liquidity of the banking system. Before the crisis the idea of the Central
Bank acting as lender of last resort was not well defined in the regulations.
19  However,
                                                
19 For a long time, the debate about the Central Bank’s functions and organization had been limited to its
relation with the government. The 1980 Constitution explicitly provided for its independence from the
Administration and prohibited the Bank to lend to it. However, these provisions did not become effective
until the passing of the Central Bank Law of 1988, and during the crisis, the government relied on the33
early on in the crisis, the Central Bank started to provide emergency loans to the banks.
The loans were funded first by shifting the backing of the monetary base at the margin, and
later by mobilizing domestic funds through the issue of bonds and by recycling the
restructured foreign debt and the new monies received in the process of restructuring the
foreign debt.
Although the funding of the loan portfolios during the crisis was never threatened, the
cost of this funding was always a serious problem.  Real interest rates on savings and time
deposits had increased sharply in the year before the beginning of the crisis. Indeed the
increase in these rates in early 1981 could be regarded as the first clear signal that the
euphoria of 1980 was coming to an end.  It is not possible to estimate the average cost of
domestic liabilities from the financial statements. Expost the average cost of total liabilities,
however, increased sharply in 1981 and 1982—from 11.7 percent in 1980 (the lowest level
of the reform period) to 14.5 and 18.4 percent respectively (Table 3.4). Most of the increase
was the result of the higher cost of domestic liabilities, although after the peso devaluation,
ex-post the cost of foreign liabilities also increased.
Table 3.4
Cost of Total Liabilities in the Chilean Financial System: 1978-89 (%)
1978 14.1 1982 18.4 1986 6.2
1979 13.1 1983 11.3 1987 6.2
1980 11.7 1984 9.7 1988 5.2
1981 14.5 1985 9.0 1989 6.9
By late 1981, the reduction of interest rates on deposits to the mid-1980 levels was
considered a prerequisite to prevent a banking crisis.  There was not much agreement,
however, on what the government could do to reduce interest rates other than issuing
currency.  At that time, the idea of distressed borrowing by the debtors of the banking
system, which assumed the complicity of their creditor banks, started to gain support, but it
was not clear how it could be prevented.  In late 1981, the large inflow of foreign credit had
failed to reduce domestic interest rates, and in early 1982, some banks attempted to jointly
force a reduction in deposit rates but they abandoned the idea rapidly. Later the devaluation
of the peso created its own pressures on interest rates, even if ex post their real values were
not as high as their expected values.  In July 1982, the government expected that the sale of
non-performing loans to the Central Bank would slow down distressed borrowing, but with
no avail.  Increasingly, the government was focusing its attention on reducing the deposit
rates to control the expansion of the banking crisis and to create the conditions for a
recovery of economic activity.
In December 1982, the government opted for pressing banks to cap their interest rates
on 30-days deposits to a level slightly higher than that of the Central Bank’s liquidity
facility. The rate ‘suggested’ by the government implied a low but positive real return on
deposits. In practice, compliance with this maximum ‘suggested’ rate became a condition to
                                                                                                                                                    
Bank to implement its policies. Also, prior to the crisis the CB role as a LOLR was somehow limited due
to the fix exchange rate system.34
have access to the Central Bank’s liquidity facility, but it was not strictly enforced,
especially at times of strong pressures on interest rates (and in November 1984, it was
explicitly abandoned for a couple of weeks). The effectiveness of this policy, which was
officially abandoned in June 1987, has been hard to assess because its implementation
coincided with other policies that ended the distressed borrowing of 1982, in particular the
measures of January 1983.
As shown in figure 3.6, real interest rates on time deposits declined in the first quarter
of 1983, and then they remained under five percent until 1990. The acceleration of inflation
after the devaluation of the peso and the subsequent changes in relative prices poses again a
serious problem to use ex-post rates as proxies for ex-ante rates. The decline in real interest
rates, but not its size, is confirmed by the lower interest rates on UF-denominated bonds,
deposits and loans (see figure 3.7). By late 1986, real ex-post rates on 90-days deposits and
interest rates on UF-denominated one-year deposits were converging at 4 percent per year.
This level was lower than the level at which they were converging in late 1980, when
suddenly the trend reversed and both rates started to increase up to a peak of over 20
percent in mid 1982.
Figure 3.6















































































































































That decline in interest rates led to a similar decline in the average cost of the total
liabilities. After reaching a peak of 18.4 percent in 1982, their average cost declined
continuously to a level of 6.2 percent in 1986 (Table 3.4). The declining trend in the
average cost of liabilities reflected both the decline in domestic rates and the decline in
international rates. The average interest rate on foreign credit—measured by LIBOR+
spread—had increased up to 17.7 percent per year in 1981, but then it declined steadily
until 1986 to 6.7 percent per year.
Between 1983 and 1986, both the interest rates on loans and the average return rate
on the banks’ asset portfolios declined sharply. The decline in interest rates on both
domestic and foreign funds was rapidly reinforced by lower spreads, so real interest rates on
loans were under 8 percent per year in 1986 (see figures 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8). And the lower
loan rates reduced the average return on the asset portfolios (including loans and other
investments) from a high rate of 23 percent in 1982 to 8.5 percent in 1986 (table 3.5). Thus,
the series on real interest rates, average cost of total liabilities and average return on the
asset portfolios show a consistent pattern through the crisis.  The low levels of late 1980 (in
relation to early 1976) were followed by large increases up to the end of 1982, and then by a
sustained decline, with the levels in late 1986 already lower than those of late 1980.
Moreover, the interest rate spreads that had increased somewhat in 1981 and 1982 declined
rapidly to the 1980 levels, and by 1986, they were below these levels.36
Figure 3.8






















Average Return on Bank’s Asset Portfolios
1978 20,5 1982 22,7 1986 8,5
1979 19,8 1983 12,8 1987 8,9
1980 18,4 1984 10,5 1988 7,8
1981 20,1 1985 11,3 1989 10,0
D. The foreign liabilities
Chile’s foreign debt increased rapidly between 1979 and 1981, when private banks
became an important mechanism for accessing the international capital markets—medium
and long-term foreign debt increased by US$241M in 1975, US$810 million per year in
1976-79, and US$2,523MM per year in 1980-81 (see Table A.4 in the annexes)
 20. By the
end of 1981, the foreign liabilities of the banking system amounted to US$7.1 billion, of
which US$400 million were due by Banco del Estado, the only remaining state-owned
bank, and around US$3.0 billion by the two largest private banks intervened in January
1983.  At the end of 1986, it was reduced to US$6.1 billion, of which US$1.3 billion were
due by Banco del Estado, and around US$1.0 billion by those two private banks.  In the five
years up to the end of 1986, there were some important changes in the country’s foreign
debt and its composition:
                                                
20 Except for trade credit short-term debt was prohibited. During 1980-81 public sector debt decreased.37
(a) The foreign liabilities of the banking system accounted for 46 percent of the country’s
foreign debt in 1981, but only 30 percent in 1986.
(b) The increase in the country’s foreign debt between 1981 and 1986 was accounted by
the new money from international banks (part of the restructuring of the outstanding
debt) and the increased access to funds from official sources.
(c)  The public sector’s share in the total foreign debt increased from one to two thirds
between the end of 1981 and the end of 1986.  In addition, the government had to
guarantee a large part of the banking system’s debt with foreign creditors.  If the latter
is added to the public sector debt, at the end of 1986, the public sector debt amounted
to over 80 percent of the country’s foreign debt.
Indeed, the management of the foreign debt was critical to the recovery of the
economy in general, and of the banking system in particular.  To a large extent, its
management was conditioned by the events of January 1983, when to liquidate a few banks
the government decided that the domestic and foreign creditors of these banks would have
to recognize a 30 percent loss of their claims.  Their foreign creditors (all international
banks) reacted immediately by not renewing Chile’s trade credit lines.  Given the
impossibility of accessing alternative sources of foreign funds, the government had no
choice but to guarantee that part of the outstanding debt that was restructured and all the
new monies to refinance part of the interest payments. Subsequent restructuring agreements
also included a government’s guarantee on that part of the debt being restructured and any
new money, but the creditor banks accepted to pay a fee for this guarantee. More important,
subsequent agreements also dealt with the reality of an emerging secondary market for this
debt that, in turn, became the basis for the so-called debt reduction programs.  By 1985, this
market was well organized, and for a few years Chilean debt was traded at discounts in the
range of 30-40 percent of book value.
Formally, debt reduction programs started when the Chilean government allowed
national and foreign investors to use in Chile the debt certificates bought in the secondary
market.  The certificates could be used for the capitalization of a Chilean company or the
repayment of an outstanding debt with Chilean banks, or they could be sold to the original
debtor at a price negotiated by the parties. The programs evolved rapidly into the ones
described in Table 3.6. The rules distinguished between programs for national investors
(Article 18 of the Foreign Exchange Transactions Law) and foreign investors (Article 19 of
the Foreign Exchange Transactions Law and Decree Law 600 on Foreign Investment). The
distinction was to ensure that national investors did not have access to the official foreign
exchange market and that foreign investors were to comply with all rules governing foreign
investment.  The restriction on the access to the foreign exchange market notwithstanding,
national investors were required to buy a quota from the Central Bank that was established
both to control the process and to allow the Central Bank to capture part of the discount.38
Table 3.6: Formal Mechanisms of Debt Reduction
Debt repurchases Debt capitalizations
Chapter XVIII Chapter XVIII
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Notes: (1) Quotas give the right to repurchase debt through an intermediary, and represent a way for the CB to capture part of the rent.
(2) Sharing clause aimed at forcing repayments to be shared by all creditors in proportion to their outstanding debts. (3) Conditions
slightly stricter for portfolio investment (mutual funds).
Between 1985 and 1990, the formal programs described accounted for a reduction of
over US$10.0 billion in the country’s foreign debt, most after 1986 (see Figure 3.9). As
detailed in Table 3.7, private banking system’s debt accounted for 43 percent of the total
reduction, and public financial institutions’ debt for 32 percent.  Most of the latter was debt
taken over by the Central Bank in the restructuring of the country’s foreign debt
21. Thus, the
share of foreign liabilities in the total liabilities of the banking system declined sharply after
1986. At the end of 1986 it was 29 percent, while in 1988 it had declined to 19 percent and
by the end of 1999 to 15 percent. However, most of the reduction was concentrated in
Banco de Chile and Banco Santiago, the two largest private banks intervened in January
1983 (Table 3.8).
The reduction of foreign debt benefited the debtor banks only to the extent that they
were able to buy back their debts at a large discount. The benefit was determined by the
cost of servicing the foreign debt relative to the cost of alternative sources of funds, and
given the high cost of the latter, in principle a high discount was necessary to make the debt
reduction beneficial.  In addition to the regulation of the programs, the access to Central
Bank’s funding and the decline in domestic interest rates made debt reduction much more
                                                
21  In addition to provide guarantees to the restructured debt that remained with private banks and companies,
through voluntary debt swaps with the Central Bank the government took over some of the private sector’s
restructured foreign debt, as well as all the restructured foreign debt of the banks that were liquidated.39
beneficial after 1986, even if the discounts were not as high as they had been earlier in the
crisis.  The direct benefit of debt reduction for Chilean debtors would have amounted to 8-
12 percent of the par value of the repurchased debt, with the remaining discount benefiting
the national or foreign investors and the Central Bank.  The direct benefit for the Chilean
banks can then be grossly estimated in the range US$340-520 million, with half of this
amount accruing to Banco de Chile and Banco Santiago.  In addition, some banks were able
to obtain an indirect benefit from the business of being an intermediary (acting on behalf of
national investors) in debt reduction transactions
22.
Table 3.7 Debt Reduction 1985-90: Composition by mechanism type
DL 600 Chapter XVIII Chapter XIX Portfolio
Swaps
Others Total Share
Public Sector US$ millions, cumulative as of Dec. 1990 40%
 - Financial 901.5 1403.8 32.7 905.8 3243.8 32%
 - Non- Financial 230.9 104.1 37.7 447.7 820.4 8%
Private Sector 60%
 - Financial 168.8 1911.2 2068.8 78.3 75 4302.1 43%
 - Non- Financial 134.9 89.2 1.2 6.8 1497.3 1729.4 17%
Total 303.7 3132.8 3577.9 155.5 2925.8 10095.7 100%
Table 3.8 Foreign Debt by type of financial institution
Foreign Debt in US$ millions as of:
December 1982 December 1990
(A) Average per firm Change (%)
Foreign banks (1) 26 21 -18%
Other domestic 102 103 1%
Other intervened 124 61 -51%
Santiago&Chile 1451 370 -74%
(B) Total for each group Change (%)
Domestic institutions 5906.6 1786.1 -70%
Foreign institutions (1) 486.6 463.0 -5%
Note: (1) Foreign banks are presented only for completeness here, but they are not relevant to the
analysis of debt-reduction operations as their debt from abroad is not considered as Chilean foreign
debt.
                                                
22 Apparently these banks were able to charge a transaction fee of 2 percentage points of the par value of the
repurchased debt (Larraín, F., 1989).40

















































































E. The recapitalization of banks
The implementation of the new rules for classifying loans and other investments in
accordance with their risks had taken much longer than anticipated, and at the beginning of
the crisis it was not well advanced. Also, the rules governing capital requirements and
provisioning were still based on the size of total liabilities rather than on the risk
composition of assets.
23  Independent of the traditional rules regarding capital requirements,
when the crisis started the banks were not able to take losses, certainly not the large losses
that the crisis imposed on them. The recognition of large losses would have led most banks
to be undercapitalized even by the traditional standards and many would have shown a
negative net worth.
The purchases of substandard loans by the Central Bank—see sub-section 3.B(3)
above—was aimed precisely at postponing the recognition of loan losses. Although it did
not increase banks’ cash flows—initially it was a pure accounting transaction—the loan
purchases avoided the recognition of solvency problems. Also, since banks were not
required to maintain capital
24 or provisions weighted by the risk of their assets, the measure
did not lead to important reversals of provisions or increases in capital-asset ratios based on
asset quality improvements.
Except for the two largest private intervened banks (Banco Santiago and Banco de
Chile) the recapitalization of banks was not an issue during the crisis—banks were able to
continue their operations as long as their accounting capital was greater or equal to 5
                                                
23 Note that at that time, capital requirements were not in general based on risk-weighted assets. This became
fashionable worldwide after the 1988 Basle Accord.
24 The standards set in the Basle Accord were implemented in Chile as recently as 1998, a decade after it
began to be implemented in the developed countries.41
percent of their liabilities. For those two banks capitalization was an issue also because the
low capital base limited their capacity to sell non-performing and risky assets to the Central
Bank. This problem was resolved for these two banks with their reprivatization—see
section G below—and starting in 1985 they fully complied with the capital requirements.
However, for all other banks—except foreign—capitalization started to be a problem in the
aftermath of the crisis as banks began cleaning up their balance sheets and raising their
provisions, and it remained a problem until 1989 (Table 3.9).
The government assumed that measures other than a direct request to increase capital
would be more effective to restore the solvency of the banking system in the short- and
medium-term. A request to increase capital would have taken some time to be met, likely
longer than the time needed for the banks to start generating a cash flow surplus if the other
government actions were effective and the economy started to recover. Indeed, each of the
measures that improved the loan portfolios and ensured the funding of these portfolios at a
low cost—debt-rescheduling programs for bank debtors, preferential exchange rate program
for debtors in foreign currency—was expected to have a positive impact on the banks’ cash
flow.
Although it was not its main purpose, the program to sell substandard loans to the
Central Bank also evolved into a measure that contributed to generate a surplus for banks.
Indeed, about 10.5 percent of the banks’ loan portfolios were sold under the new regime
that guaranteed a profit of 2 percent per year (see section 3.B (3) above). Thus, starting in
1985 and for four years (the original maturity of the CB promissory note), banks made a
certain profit per year of 0.21 percent on their loan portfolios (note that this profit was
based on low quality assets that were transferred to the CB).
In addition to the measures to resolve the banking crisis and the recovery of the
economy, the recapitalization of banks was facilitated by the income tax reform of 1984,
although the size of its effect is not known. One of the main objectives of this reform was to
provide an incentive for all companies not to distribute profits. The incentive was in the
form of a marginal personal income tax higher for interest income than for dividends. This
tax reform reversed a situation that existed since 1974, that put a premium on debt over
equity financing because of double taxation on dividends.
25
The tax reform soon had the intended effect of lowering the cost of equity capital
relative to that of debt capital, when the latter was already high, encouraging therefore the
reinvestment of profits into debt payment. The reform also provided tax incentives for the
conversion of debt into equity—in addition to the discount obtained in the secondary
international debt market discussed above—through a special tax credit given to investors
in new shares (IPOs). The credit was proportional to the initial investment and consisted of
a discount on the investor’s tax base for all the years that he held the new shares, but the
benefit was not transferable.
                                                
25 For instance, for an individual in the 40 percent income tax bracket, investing in an asset through debt
meant an actual tax on returns of 40 percent. For the same investment project financed through equity,
however, until 1984 her actual tax rate was 46 percent. After 1984 her personal tax rate on this investment
dropped to 37 percent (Hernández and Walker, 1993).42
Indeed, bank profits were negative or disappeared during the crisis for all banks, and
remained nil for all intervened banks until 1988—banks were required to use all their
profits to provision for the repurchase of assets sold to the CB. However, all national banks
(other than Banco Santiago and Banco de Chile) were able to raise their capital base
immediately after their profits resumed (Table 3.9). In sum, the recapitalization of banks—
other than the two named above—depended on their ability to generate profits that could be
reinvested. To this end the 1984 tax reform played a crucial role by providing incentives for
the capitalization of all firms, financial and not financial—i.e., the tax reform also
facilitated the restructuring of debts in the corporate sector.
Table 3.9 Chilean Financial System: Financial Ratios
Equity/total assets 1982 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Foreign banks 16.3% 7.1% 4.7% 4.8% 7.1% 9.1% n.a
Non-intervened 9.9% 4.8% 4.2% 4.0% 4.2% 4.8% 5.2%
Intervened 7.5% 4.9% 5.2% 5.4% 4.7% 5.0% 5.7%
Santiago and Chile 5.8% 4.0% 5.4% 7.0% 5.1% 5.7% 6.1%
Others 7.9% 5.3% 5.1% 4.7% 4.3% 4.4% 5.3%
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Profits/equity
Foreign banks 6.2% -2.3% 0.0% 28.2% 8.5% 5.6% 7.2% 6.6%
Non-intervened -9.6% -8.5% 0.0% 0.8% 6.8% 9.0% 8.0% 23.0%
Intervened -17.0% -41.4% -81.3% -5.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.4%
Santiago and Chile -4.2% -84.6% -148.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.8%
Others -19.9% -27.0% -58.8% -7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 2.1%
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Provisions/total assets(*)
Foreign banks 1.86% 0.99% 1.49% 1.29% 1.15% 0.94% 0.72% 0.74%
Non-intervened 2.48% 2.38% 2.06% 1.75% 2.02% 2.48% 3.30% 3.76%
Intervened 2.24% 2.81% 4.11% 1.83% 3.59% 3.56% 7.23% 3.09%
Santiago and Chile 1.10% nd 5.97% 3.45% 5.09% 3.66% 3.99% 4.05%
Others 2.53% nd 3.49% 1.29% 2.56% 3.27% 8.00% 2.14%
(*)  Comprises provisions to repurchase assets sold to the CB
F. The takeover of distressed banks and financial companies
Between 1981 and 1986, 21 financial institutions were intervened by the government
and either liquidated or rehabilitated and privatized (see Table 3.11). Almost all of these
interventions, and certainly the most important ones, occurred during 1981-83. In this
section we analyze the rationale for these government actions.
In November 1981, four banks and four financial companies were intervened.
Apparently the decision was based on the results of the risk assessments of their loan
portfolios.  The risk assessment exercises had started in early 1980 but it took a long time to
identify the institutions that could not comply with the new regulations.  Moreover, given
the lags in collecting and analyzing the relevant information, it is likely that the assessments
did not reflect properly the deterioration in the portfolios due to the rapid slowdown of the
economy in the second half of 1981. At the time of the intervention, the government
justified it by reference to the problems of each institution rather than to macroeconomic43
problems. In particular, the culprit were poor administration and banking practices such as
excessive lending to related parties, poor provisioning associated with excessive credit
growth, and large maturity mismatches (long-term portfolio funded with short-term
deposits)
26. Only two small banks and one financial company were intervened during 1982.
Again the intervention was justified by reference to the specific problems of each
institution, in particular a high concentration of loans with related parties, although by that
time it should have been difficult to separate these problems from the effects of the
economic depression.
The eleven interventions of 1981 and 1982 were concluded with the liquidation of the
four smallest banks and the five finance companies, whereas the other two banks were soon
sold to foreign investors. This was so because the government did not want to take the
responsibility of capitalizing and managing the intervened institutions.  Moreover, in the
case of the two large banks intervened in November 1981, their resolution was facilitated
because of the interest of well known foreign banks, with small branches operating in the
country, to acquire their assets and liabilities.
The intervention of seven banks and one finance company in January 1983 was quite
different from those of 1981 and 1982.  The government’s intention was to accelerate the
resolution of the ongoing crisis first by sending a signal that both the owners and the
creditors of distressed institutions would have to take some of the losses (thus, the
justification for liquidating immediately two banks and the financial company).  Second, it
intended to stop the rollover of loans that had pushed interest rates to very high levels
(hence, the justification for intervening the two largest private banks which were also the
flagships of the two main economic groups). According to the data available at the time of
the intervention, the government took over the administration of those banks and financial
companies that were in a weaker financial position—those with losses in excess of their net
worth.  Starting in September 1982, the government had asked banks to classify their major
debtors into viable and non-viable.  In particular, after providing specific assumptions for
the key macro variables, the government asked banks to make cash flow projections for the
assets of each large debtor.  Based on the projections banks had to estimate their potential
losses. At the time the exercise was completed the estimated losses for all the institutions
supervised by the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions amounted to more
than twice the institutions’ total net worth. At this point it was decided that all institutions
whose losses exceeded three times their equity would be liquidated, while the others would
be capitalized and privatized. This led to the liquidation of two banks and one finance
company, the merger of another bank, and the rehabilitation and privatization of the
remaining four banks.
As shown in figures 3.10 through 3.12, the intervened financial institutions were less
capitalized (or more leveraged) and less profitable than other banks and financial
companies. However, with the exception of the two largest banks—Banco Santiago and
Banco de Chile—they did not rely on foreign credit to finance their operations more than
                                                
26 Only in one case—Banco de Fomento de Valparaíso—the main reason given was the financial difficulties
of one of its major debtors which, in turn, was caused by it pursuing a risky investment strategy
(Estrategia, November 10-15, 1981).44
non-intervened banks.  The two largest banks incurred in greater foreign indebtedness and
were exposed to suffer larger losses in case of devaluation (though this was reflected in
their credit risk instead of their currency risk). Also, as shown in table 3.10, the ratio of
related lending was higher in the intervened banks, a conclusion that holds even after













































































































































































































Table 3.10 Share of lending to related parties (% of loan portfolio)
June 1982 December 1982 February 1983
Intervened banks (6) 24.0 25.6
Other banks (10) 11.8 12.6
Banks belonging to a conglomerate
Intervened (6) 23.0 22.0 25.6
Others (7) 15.1 15.0 15.0
Note: numbers in brackets is the sample size.
Concerning the banks that were intervened but not liquidated, the government
attempted to ensure that their cash flows were going to improve substantially in a short
period of time. The government decided that the economic cost of closing them was higher
than their rehabilitation cost, which was mainly based on their size (too big to fail) and the
potential negative effect on depositors’ confidence in the financial system. Concerning the
institutions that were liquidated
27, the decision was based on the fact that the cost to
rehabilitate them was believed to be higher than the potential benefits. In the case of the
institutions intervened in 1981-82 and later on liquidated, no losses were imposed on
depositors. In the case of the 3 institutions intervened in 1983 and liquidated, domestic
creditors suffered a loss equal to 30 percent of their claims (as mentioned above, foreign
depositors were compensated in full by the government).
                                                
27 With losses larger than three times their equity.46
Table 3.11 Financial Institutions Intervened
Institution Name Year Intervened Outcome
Banco de Linares 1981 Liquidated
Banco de Fomento de Valparaíso Liquidated
Banco de Talca Sold to foreign interests
Banco Español-Chile Sold to foreign interests
Compañía General Financiera Liquidated
Financiera CASH S.A. Liquidated
Financiera de Capitales S.A. Liquidated
Sociedad Financiera del Sur S.A. Liquidated
Banco de Fomento del Bío-Bío 1982 Liquidated
Banco Austral de Chile Liquidated
Adelantos y Créditos S.A.F. Liquidated
Financiera CIGA S.A. 1983 Liquidated
Banco Unido de Fomento Liquidated
Banco Hipotecario de Chile Liquidated
Banco Colocadora Nacional de Valores Merged
Banco Internacional Rehabilitated and privatized
Banco de Chile Rehabilitated and privatized
Banco Santiago Rehabilitated and privatized
Banco Concepción Rehabilitated and privatized
Financiera Davens S.A. 1986 Liquidated
Financiera Mediterráneo Liquidated
G. The reprivatization of the two largest banks
In 1985, the government decided to privatize several enterprises which had been state
property before the Allende government and which it had opted not to privatize in the
1970s.  The new phase of privatization led to a reduction in the share of public enterprises
in GDP from 24 per cent in 1981 to 16 per cent in 1988.  The government relied on four
mechanisms to privatize the enterprises: (i) competitive bidding for stock packages, (ii)
capitalismo popular (sale to small investors), (iii) capitalismo laboral (sale of shares to
employees of the enterprise
28), and (iv) capitalismo institucional (sale of shares to the
newly created privately administered pension funds).  In the case of highly indebted
enterprises, debt for equity swaps also allowed their sale to foreign investors.
The government had always intended to return the ownership, control and
management of the intervened banks to private investors.  In particular, it was eager to
privatize the two largest banks, Banco de Chile and Banco Santiago,
29 to ensure their
recapitalization and the improvement of their loan portfolios.  These two objectives were
linked.  By May 1985, the cumulative losses of the two banks
30 amounted to 11 and 26 per
                                                
28 In most cases employees paid the shares using their individual separation compensation accounts. These
accounts accumulated the sums that the employees would receive as severance payments when leaving the
company. The most common compensation packages comprised one monthly wage for each year the
individual had worked in the company.
29 These two banks represented in March 1983, about 35 per cent of the loan portfolio of the entire banking
system, and about 41 per cent of the loan portfolio of the private banking system. The difference between
these two figures is given by the share of Banco del Estado.
30 These figures comprise the stock of bad assets that up to that date had been transferred (sold) to the47
cent of total assets, respectively.  Moreover, the losses were expected to rise as the clean up
process proceeded further—by March 1986, Banco de Chile’s cumulative losses amounted
to 22 per cent of total assets, and for Banco Santiago to 33 per cent.  Thus, the two banks
were technically bankrupt and needed to be recapitalized.  Besides, banks were allowed to
sell bad assets to the Central Bank for up to 3.5 times of their capital, and the
recapitalization would allow them to increase the sale of additional nonperforming assets,
improving their portfolios.
In early 1985, the government decided to increase the capital of the two banks.  The
capitalization took place by issuing shares for around US$235 million and US$148 million
for Banco de Chile and Banco Santiago, respectively
31. These amounts increased their
accounting equity by about 132 and 96 per cent, but excluding the accumulated losses.  As
shown in Table 3.12 below, the capital increase allowed the two banks to sell additional bad
loans to the Central Bank for an amount equivalent to 30 per cent of the loan portfolios
32.
Table 3.12: Assets sold to the CB
Banco de Chile 1984 1985 1986
Assets sold to CB over total loans (%) 7.7 35.48 39.03
Banco Santiago
Assets sold to CB over total loans (%) 18.97 47.97 52.46
Source: Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions.
The privatization of Banco de Chile and Banco Santiago was implemented through
capitalismo popular, that is, through the sale of new shares to small investors. Rather than
to maximize revenue, the government’s intention was to maximize the number of new
shareholders, so ownership would not be concentrated as it was before the intervention.
The government shared the view that the concentration of ownership in the conglomerates
or  grupos economicos had been an important cause of the crisis—at the end of 1982, the
related portfolio of Banco Santiago was estimated at about 45 per cent of total loans, and
that of Banco de Chile at about 20 per cent (Larraín, 1989). Since the crisis had eroded the
credibility of market-oriented policies, the government looked for new ways to establish
private ownership again in the financial sector.
The sale of the two newly viable banks implied that 88 percent of Banco de Chile’s
total capital was raised from the new shareholders, and about 95 percent of Banco
Santiago’s.  However, this capital did not take into account the accumulated losses from the
substandard loans sold to the Central Bank—later known as the subordinated debt—so de
facto the old shareholders owned a much lower share of the banks. Actually, the old
                                                                                                                                                    
Central Bank (see section 3.B (3) above).
31 The capital increases arose also from the transformation into equity of the emergency loans granted by the
Central Bank to these institutions in previous years.
32 For Banco de Chile this represented to US$ 1,023 million (in December 1990 dollars), which together with
the recapitalization for US$ MM 235.25, allowed to eliminate the net worth deficit estimated at about
US$1,597 million in early 1985, creating a viable bank (Hachette and Luders, 1993).48
shareholders could not be paid dividends until they had repurchased all the substandard
loans sold to the Central Bank.  The new owners, or capitalistas populares, owned
preferred stock and were entitled to receive dividends for up to 30 per cent of the bank
profits.
To undertake the privatization of the two banks, CORFO—the same government
agency that owned and controlled the banks during the Allende government and was in
charge of all state enterprises during the military government—was authorized to grant
loans to all potential buyers at a zero real interest rate.  The credits were for 15 years and for
up to 95 per cent of the value of the stock.  The credits were indexed to past inflation but
with no interest, and with one-year grace period for repaying the principal.  Indeed, to
guarantee that ownership was going to be widely spread, a ceiling was established on the
total amount of the stock a person could buy. The maximum amount was linked to his/her
tax returns (taxes paid) during the past three years, with a ceiling of about US$32,000 per
investor. In addition, investors received tax benefits for the purchase of stock and discounts
for early repayment of the loan.  Thus, there was a large subsidy for investing in the two
banks, proportional to the marginal tax bracket of each taxpayer.  For instance, for Banco de
Chile the subsidy was estimated at 40 per cent for a taxpayer with a marginal tax rate of 15
per cent (Hachette and Luders, 1993).
The rationale for linking the purchase of stocks to total taxes paid in previous years
and the other tax benefits was to reimburse domestic investors in proportion to their
contribution, as taxpayers, to the resolution of the banking crisis.  Also, to offset the general
distrust to invest in securities due to the experience of the crisis, the government attempted
to ensure the profitability and safety of the new shares.
As of April 1986, less than a year since the privatization program had started, the
increase in total capital amounted to UF 5,765,500 (US$88.4 MM approximately) for
Banco de Chile, and UF 4,262,688 (US$65.3 MM approximately) for Banco Santiago,
equivalent to 51 and 60 per cent of the capital increase authorized by the government.
Ownership of the new capital was spread among 12,900 shareholders for Banco de Chile,
and 9,200 for Banco Santiago.  However, as shown in table 3.13, by December 1986 the
program was successfully completed for both banks. Through this program over 67,000
shareholders became capitalistas populares so the program succeeded in bringing about a
low level of ownership concentration.49
Table 3.13: Number of shares and ownership structure









Jun-84 600 98,23% Jun-84 1.500 27,16%
Jun-85 600 100,00% Jun-85 1.500 36,32%
Jun-86 6.840 5,19% Jun-86 8.500 6,77%
Dic-86 12.000 10,14% Dic-86 12.500 2,41%
Dic-87 12.000 10,14% Dic-87 12.216 3,71%
Dic-88 11.700 8,09% Dic-88 12.216 4,01%
Dic-89 11.700 8,51% Dic-89 12.169 3,81%
As shown in figures 3.13 through 3.15, after the intervention and privatization by the
government these two banks showed a steady improvement in efficiency, although the latter
reflects both the recovery in economic activity—including the recovery in lending and
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4.  FINAL REMARKS
After 1984 the Chilean economy entered into a period of sustained high growth that
lasted until late 1998.  Sometime in 1988, per capita GDP exceeded the record level of
1981, and since then it has continued to grow at an average annual rate of about 5 percent.
With hindsight, any assessment of the government intervention to resolve the banking crisis
must identify the extent to which the intervention turned out to be critical for such high
growth path.  Unfortunately it is not possible to assess the contribution of government
intervention and other factors first in the recovery and later in the sustained growth of the
economy.  For example, there is no simple answer to the question of how important the
sharp improvement in the terms of trade was for the exceptional performance of 1987-89.
Thus, rather than attempting to estimate the relative importance of the many factors that
may have contributed to that performance, it is better to define the conditions under which
that government intervention would have been critical.
Notwithstanding the importance of external shocks in explaining the recession of
1982-83, some domestic forces played a key role in causing it and/or in amplifying the
impact of the external shocks.  To the extent that government actions and policies were a
major domestic cause of the recession, the intervention to resolve the banking crisis should
be seen as a simple correction of the negative effects of such actions and policies.  The net
effect of all government actions and policies during this period was likely negative. If the
long-term growth path of GDP was grossly unaffected, then the temporary loss of output
and income in 1982-88 was indeed a large cost that exceeded the benefit of a higher income
during 1980-81.  This would amount to argue that governmental actions engineered an
unsustainable boom whose correction demanded costly actions, with a negative net effect
over the entire cycle.  Except for the choice of instruments, it would have been similar to
earlier attempts to engineer a boom through expansionary fiscal policies.
However, if forces beyond government control caused the recession, the intervention
to resolve the banking crisis would have been beneficial.  This assumes that the recession
was largely the result of external shocks and that in the absence of a government
intervention the banking crisis would have lasted much longer.  In this case, the benchmark
to assess the magnitude of the benefit should be the low level of output in 1983.  In contrast
to the 1975 depression when the large external shock affected directly the public finances
and forced an extraordinary fiscal adjustment, in 1982-83 the external shock affected
directly the private sector and forced an adjustment that was possible only because of
government intervention.  The intervention was needed because the weaknesses of the legal
and political institutions led to a pervasive expectation of a government bailout, and
therefore to a Ponzi game.  To break this game, the government had no choice but to
intervene, and to do it massively.
The many studies of the recession notwithstanding, it is not possible to assess the
relative importance of the two sets of forces as causes and triggers of the recession.  It
appears, however, that independent of the ultimate causes of the recession and the events
that triggered it, the expectation of a government bailout was a critical determinant of its52
magnitude as it delayed the resolution of conflicts between some borrowers and their
creditors. In comparison with other experiences, the expectation of a devaluation of the
Chilean peso did not trigger the recession and it hardly had a large impact on its magnitude.
When the government finally abandoned its fixed exchange rate policy in June 1982, there
was a short period in which the expectation of a further depreciation of the Chilean peso
aggravated the ongoing recession, but more important, the devaluation exacerbated the
expectation of a bailout.
The recession and the banking crisis made evident the need for additional reforms.
The government’s modernization program was already advanced when the recession
started, but the new economic system had yet to be tested.  In the years until the end of the
military government (March 1990), new reforms were undertaken and at least some would
have had a large impact on the performance of the economy during the late 1980s.  The new
banking law (1986) attempted to correct the main weaknesses of the system that emerged in
the late 1970s, and it contributed to the stability of the banking system when the
government privatized—in 1985-86—the two largest banks intervened in January 1983.
The new income tax law of 1984 provided effective incentives to increase the private
savings ratio in the late 1980s and to change the financial structure of Chilean companies.
And the copper stabilization fund (1985) signaled the government’s intention of smoothing
out its own expenditure over time.  These and other reforms strengthened greatly the
foundations for high and sustained economic growth, and government intervention to solve
the banking crisis could have been a sort of prerequisite to undertake them.
In 1988, per capita GDP recovered its record level of 1981.  It was not a fast
recovery, but it was faster than the recovery of other Latin American countries that suffered
similar banking crisis.  As shown in Figure 4.1, the crisis in Uruguay took one year longer,
while Argentina stayed stagnant until 1991 as the 1985 recovery turned to be temporary.
More important, the path of economic growth of the three countries has been quite
different: in 1984-96, the (simple) average for Argentina and Uruguay was less than half the
growth experienced by Chile (Figure 4.2).  In the early 1980s, it was common to look at the
three countries as having gone through similar process of failed financial liberalization, but
as the record of the past fifteen years has shown, the foundations of the Chile’s banking
system were stronger than those of Argentina and Uruguay.  Government intervention was
needed to break the Ponzi game, but once it was broken, it did not take long to strengthen
the foundations.
In sum, the debate on the causes of the crisis notwithstanding, as the crisis deepened
government intervention became inevitable.  Thus, the benefit of this intervention was there
for the government to realize it by relying on cost-effective instruments. Compared with
other countries in similar situations, the policies adopted by Chile appear to have been more
effective in triggering a faster and more sustainable recovery. Nevertheless, two questions
should still be answered: first, how costly the intervention was, and second, how the cost
could have been reduced.
The fiscal cost of the different programs to resolve the financial crisis was high.
Indeed, as shown in Table 4.1, the cumulative cost of each program fluctuated from 2.4 to53
14.7 percent of GDP, with a total fiscal cost equivalent to around 42 percent of GDP over
1982-89.
33 However, despite the large fiscal or quasi-fiscal deficits of government
intervention, the programs amounted largely to a redistribution of income within the
country.  Independent of any judgement on fairness about this redistributive effect, about 86
percent of the fiscal cost were a transfer between nationals and the remaining 14 percent a
transfer to foreign creditors.  In addition to this transfer to foreign creditors, the economic
cost of government intervention included the cost of administering the different programs.
It is difficult to estimate this cost with accuracy, however. Assuming that programs 1, 3,
and 5 were relatively ‘expensive’ to administer, each one with a cost equal to 10 percent of
the fiscal cost, and the others relatively cheaper at half that amount, the total administrative
cost would amount to 8.73 percent of GDP.
34 This, we believe, is an upper limit of the
administrative cost, and likely the actual cost was much lower.
The fiscal and administrative costs of government intervention were indeed high.
As shown by the fine-tuning of the programs, the fiscal cost could have been lower, albeit
not much, especially the transfer to foreign creditors.  In 1983-85, the government was in a
weak bargaining position with foreign creditors because of the limited access to alternative
sources of foreign capital. The many programs, and their subsequent fine-tuning, were not
the result of a comprehensive and consistent plan but the reaction to economic and political
developments.  Perhaps such a plan would have allowed to reduce somewhat the fiscal cost
of the programs that benefited bank debtors directly, in particular the preferential exchange
rate program.  There was however no choice between bailing out the bank debtors directly
or indirectly through the banks.  Because of private ownership of the banks, the programs
were aimed directly at benefiting the bank debtors; otherwise, the government could have
hardly controlled the final use of the funds and would have been forced to take over several
other banks.
In sum, at least by the end of 1982, government intervention was a foregone
conclusion and its net benefit was conditioned on the cost effectiveness of the actual
programs.  Even if the fiscal costs of domestic transfers were larger than actually needed,
the recovery probed to be a rapid and sustainable one. Also, the economic costs of the
transfers to foreign creditors and the administration of the programs hardly could have been
lower.
                                                
33 This cost is due to the external shock, the macro policies (i.e., the devaluation) and poor banking practices,
all of which contributed through different channels to the banking crisis.
34 These estimates are not based on any rigorous method and are rather subjective. The aim of showing them
is to have an order of magnitude of what we believe could have been the actual cost of administering the
different programs.54




1. Rescheduling of domestic debts 2.7 (2) Transfer to nationals
2. Preferential exchange rate to domestic debtors in
foreign currency
14.7 Transfer to nationals
3. Liquidation of insolvent financial institutions 11.0 Transfer to nationals
4. Purchase of Banks’ and Finance Companies’ non-
performing (substandard) assets
5.7 Transfer to nationals
5. Rehabilitation and privatization of banks intervened
by the government (Santiago and Chile)
2.4 Transfer to nationals
6. Foreign exchange losses (3) 6.1 Transfer to foreigners
TOTAL 42.6
Notes:  (1) The cost is measured as the cost each year divided by that year’s GDP, and then summed over
the entire 1982-89 period. (2) Preliminary and subject to revision. (3) Losses incurred by the Central Bank
after it assumed the foreign debt of the financial institutions that were liquidated.
Sources: Eyzaguirre and Larrañaga (1991); Marshall and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994); Sanhueza (1998).
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